ADMINISTRATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY STAFFING AND OPERATIONS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE

EIGHTY-EIGHTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JULY 24 AND SEPTEMBER 18, 1963

PART 3

Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Operations

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
96-855 WASHINGTON : 1963

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ADMINISTRATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY

WEDNESDAY, JULY 24, 1963

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
STAFFING AND OPERATIONS,
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

[This hearing was held in executive session and subsequently ordered made public by the chairman of the committee.]

The subcommittee met at 9 a.m., pursuant to notice, in room 3112, New Senate Office Building, Senator Henry M. Jackson (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senators Jackson, Pell, and Miller.

Staff members present: Dorothy Fosdick, staff director; Robert W. Tufts, chief consultant; Robert C. Fisk, research assistant; Judith J. Spahr, chief clerk; and Laurel A. Engberg, minority consultant.

OPENING STATEMENT OF THE CHAIRMAN

Senator JACKSON. The subcommittee will come to order.

Today our subcommittee continues its hearings on the role of U.S. ambassadors and the missions they head in the conduct of our relations with other nations.

This subject forms part of the subcommittee's broad nonpartisan study into problems of national security administration.

We opened this phase of our hearings last month with testimony from two recently retired career ambassadors—the Honorable Ellis O. Briggs and the Honorable H. Freeman Matthews. Today we hear from an outstanding noncareer ambassador.

We are pleased to welcome the Honorable Edwin O. Reischauer, Ambassador of the United States to Japan. Ambassador Reischauer did his undergraduate work at Oberlin College and his graduate work at Harvard University. He has had a distinguished career as a student and teacher of Far Eastern affairs, and was called from his professorship at Harvard to his present post. Over the years the Government has frequently drawn upon his knowledge and experience for advice on important matters.

He is the author of a number of books, including *Japan, Past and Present* (1946); *Wanted: An Asian Policy* (1955); and *United States and Japan* (1957).

Ambassador Reischauer is a gifted linguist and a distinguished scholar, qualities which have contributed greatly to his work in a country of very great importance.

Ambassador Reischauer, we are all happy to have you with us today.

I believe you have a prepared statement, and if there is no objection on the part of the subcommittee, we shall include it at this point in the record.

STATEMENT OF HON. EDWIN O. REISCHAUER, AMBASSADOR TO JAPAN

Ambassador REISCHAUER. I am very pleased to be here with the subcommittee today to discuss the administration of national security with particular reference to the role of the Embassy in Japan. Some idea of the amount of coordination required for the administration of national security problems in Japan may be gained by noting that there are 21 different departments and affiliated agencies of the U.S. Government represented in Tokyo in addition to the State Department. As a matter of convenience, I attach to this statement two organization charts, the first giving the division of work in the Embassy itself, and the second giving the Embassy's relationship to affiliated U.S. Government agencies.

The important things to note in looking at these charts are first, that USIS operates as an integral part of the Embassy, forming one of its five major sections, and second, that with a few exceptions, which I will refer to at greater length below, each one of the other affiliated agencies is administratively attached to an operative section of the Embassy itself. Thus, for example, the Federal Aviation Agency, the Foreign Agricultural Service, the U.S. Trade Center, the Maritime Administration, the U.S. Travel Service, the Office of International Finance of the Treasury Department, the Bureau of Customs of the Treasury Department, and the small remnant of AID left in Tokyo are assigned for administrative purposes to the economic section. Similarly, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Immigration and Naturalization Service are assigned to the consular section, the General Accounting Office to the administrative section, and the Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission, with its laboratories in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, to the political section.

Several offices are for administrative purposes assigned directly to my own, which includes the office of the deputy chief of mission. This is the situation with respect to the scientific attaché, who coordinates closely with representatives in Tokyo of the Atomic Energy Commission, the National Science Foundation, and the National Institutes of Health. The same is true of the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) and the attachés of the three military services. All these offices also coordinate very closely with the political section. With respect to MAAG and the service attachés, a special branch of the political section, the politico-military branch, is constituted for the specific purpose of coordinating matters with the military sector. Thus, the politico-military branch has responsibility for day-to-day coordination of all matters coming under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and the Status of Forces Agreement with Japan, the Security Consultative Committee, military aid program, and so on. Again, although the scientific attaché and the service attachés are, as I say, attached to my office, the latter also attend the staff meetings of the political and economic sections at least once a week, and a representative of the scientific attaché attends political section staff meet-

ings daily. For purposes of even closer coordination in the important scientific sector, the representative of the Atomic Energy Commission also sits in once a week at the political and the economic section staff meetings.

You will have gathered even from these preliminary remarks that a good deal of staffing is required for proper coordination of the manifold duties performed by the Embassy and its affiliated agencies, and in order to permit representation of the U.S. Government in Japan to be orchestrated so that they are in harmony with each other as well as with overall U.S. policy toward Japan.

It might therefore be of interest to you if I proceeded to set forth in somewhat more detail the staff meeting schedule established in the Embassy for the purpose of that orchestration to which I have referred. All the operative sections of the Embassy as a general rule have morning staff meetings shortly after the opening of business each day. One of the functions of these meetings is to sift out important matters to be taken up at my own staff meeting, which is usually held daily at 10:30 a.m. This is attended by the chiefs of the political, economic, consular, and administrative sections and by the Director of the U.S. Information Service in Japan, as well as by the deputy chief of mission, my special assistant and staff aide, the press attaché, and such other officers as each regular participant might consider as contributing usefully to any subject which may be due for discussion on a particular day.

In addition, a country team meeting and a so-called large staff meeting are held alternately each Thursday in place of my usual staff meeting. The "large staff meeting" is attended by the representatives of all the sections in the Embassy and of all affiliated agencies in Tokyo. At this larger meeting, we discuss matters which are of wide common concern, such as, for example, cotton textile negotiations, or the basic elements of the problem created by the U.S. Government's desire to have nuclear-powered submarines visit Japanese ports.

At this point, I should like to speak in more detail about the country team and its place in the formulation and implementation of U.S. policy in Japan. In my view, the execution of U.S. national policy and the coordination of policy recommendation and guidance have been greatly facilitated through the agency of the country team. Thus, the country team has provided an excellent mechanism for continuous discussion and coordination of action relating to such significant problems, for example, as the implementation of provisions of the security treaty with respect to U.S. military forces in Japan, the military assistance program, and the overall review of situations in nearby troubled areas as they apply to U.S. objectives in Japan. As these and other problems have become more and more complex, and have required greater joint efforts by U.S. Government officials and agencies in Japan, the system of fortnightly meetings of the country team referred to earlier has evolved. By providing a forum more suitable for complex discussion than earlier informal luncheon meetings, which were the means used to bring together what is now the country team prior to 1956, these fortnightly meetings have increased the value and usefulness of the coordination process.

A significant increase in the value of the country team concept has also resulted from the participation of a wide range of U.S. officials in

team meetings. While the formal members of the country team include only myself, the commander, U.S. forces, Japan, and the Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group, regular participants in team meetings in Tokyo, and in the day-to-day work of the team, include in addition the deputy chief of mission; the minister for economic affairs; the minister for cultural and public affairs (USIS); the political counselor; the Army, Navy, and Air attachés; the chief of the internal affairs branch of the political section; and the chief of the political military branch of the political section.

It will be noted that in addition to Chief, MAAG, the commander, U.S. forces, Japan, is a key member of the country team. This is essential for the proper consideration of the many vital policy problems which arise in Japan as a result of our security treaty and the presence of some 45,000 U.S. military personnel (plus an additional 55,000 dependents) in the country. It will also be noted that unlike the situation in many other countries, AID is not a constituent member of the team. This is because the economic assistance program in Japan has been eliminated and only a residual AID office remains in Tokyo to supervise offshore procurement and third country training in Japan.

Coordinating country team operations, staffing for position papers, recording and distributing the minutes and preparing agenda for country team meetings are responsibilities of the Embassy's political-military branch. Happily, in spite of the relatively great distances physically separating the basic elements of the country team—U.S. forces, Japan, for example, is over an hour's drive from the Embassy—coordination has been accomplished without serious difficulty.

It may not be inappropriate at this point to note that successful coordination is at least partly a result of the excellent personal relations existing among country team participants. These relations allow the group truly to function as a team and not merely as an assembly of representatives of different government agencies.

The fortnight meetings are held in the Embassy conference room. Complete flexibility in scheduling meetings is maintained, however, and ad hoc meetings are held as necessary. Similarly, regular meetings are canceled if none of the members has sufficiently important business to justify holding them.

Basic procedure for preparing the agenda for these meetings is well established. At the beginning of the week in which a meeting is scheduled, the chief of the Embassy's political military branch communicates with (1) the Secretary, Joint Staff, Headquarters, Commander, USFJ, and (2) the Office of Chief, MAAG, Japan, in order to ascertain what items those components of the team wish to propose for inclusion in the agenda. This information, along with any agenda items the various sections of the Embassy may wish discussed at the meeting, is then passed to the Counselor for Political Affairs, who outlines the proposed agenda to me at my daily staff meeting. On the basis of the proposed agenda, and after such consultation with other U.S. officials as may be required, I decide whether or not to hold the regular meeting.

While the activities of the country team are most clearly focused in fortnightly meetings, they are not limited to them, for by necessity much work requiring sustained attention and effort must be dealt with on a continuous basis outside the structure of actual meetings.

Indeed, matters which may require country team approval are most often staffed through the country team mechanism without there being any need to convoke a formal meeting. Further, it would be rare for any item on the agenda of a given meeting not to have been fully staffed at the working level before becoming a subject of country team discussion. To a great extent, therefore, the country team's work involves reviewing recommendations worked out at the staff level and arriving at an agreed position or course of action.

Thus, by means of a system of fortnightly meetings and extensive staff work outside these meetings, the work of the country team in Japan is coordinated, and discussion and implementation of U.S. policy on a broad front are facilitated. It is my belief that the system which has been evolved is well suited to assist in the formulation and execution of U.S. Government policy in Japan.

I would imagine that this brief statement of the organization of the Embassy and of its role in the administration of national security has raised some questions in your minds. My hope is that what I have said will serve as a basis for a more detailed discussion of this subject and I welcome any questions you might have.

(The two organizational charts referred to previously entitled "The American Embassy, Tokyo, Japan, July 1, 1963" and "The American Embassy and Affiliated Agencies, Tokyo, Japan, July 1, 1963," appear at pp. 223 and 224.)

Senator JACKSON. We are very happy to have your statement, Ambassador Reischauer. We will proceed now to ask questions.

Do you have any additional comments that you wish to make prior to our questions?

Ambassador REISCHAUER. I might just add a few remarks.

First of all, I am testifying from a very different point of view from your previous witnesses. Not having had a career in the Foreign Service, all I can possibly add is a freshness of point of view of an outsider who has been in it only a little over 2 years.

Some of the problems that have come up have been problems of whether or not the overall diplomatic establishment was too large for adequate policy coordination, whether or not the flood of messages back and forth between the embassies and Washington was so great that policy was somewhat lost sight of in this great flow of words.

My own feeling, after two and a quarter years' experience in Japan, is that neither of these worries is really well founded.

We have in Japan a fairly large diplomatic establishment.

I have seen no problem of policy coordination, no problem of organization. These certainly are not too large to handle, by any means. It does take a certain amount of organization, perhaps, to see that different diverse branches do not get in each other's way, but I have not seen any serious problem of that sort at all in Japan.

And while we do have a tremendous exchange of materials between ourselves and Washington, it has always seemed to me valuable. You need this exchange at all sorts of different levels, and I think there is a pragmatically efficient way, a very sensitive way, of sorting out the important things for the right sort of attention.

There are perhaps ways in which this can be further perfected, but the whole mechanism seems to me to work very well.

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Senator JACKSON. You do not find any problems of excessive reporting?

Ambassador REISCHAUER. Back here, perhaps, some people might feel that way.

Senator JACKSON. I mean from your end.

Ambassador REISCHAUER. No; not from our end. Not from our end at all.

There is this flood of paper, and one wonders whether it is all necessary, but I think one finds that there are ways in which one can keep on top of it, and then it all proves valuable.

In fact, we are always asking for more information on certain things; and Washington is, too, the other way around. If there is any danger, it is sometimes that we do not get the details back and forth to each other fast enough.

Senator JACKSON. What methods have you used to better utilize the information that flows in? You have a good, competent staff, I take it. And are you able to delegate your work sufficiently?

Ambassador REISCHAUER. Yes; I think so. I mean that is the whole point in having an organization of this sort, to be sure that the important thing comes to the top, and that the people at the top do not get flooded by it.

I should say there is one problem in messages going back and forth: at what level do you need clearance? This is a problem you always have to keep watching, because every now and then people down the line will send out a message expressing the view of the Embassy, and I think if we express a view on something rather than just reporting, you need fairly high clearance. There are problems of this sort.

Going the other way, I think there is sometimes difficulty in knowing who is actually speaking to you in a message. They are all signed "Rusk," let us say, but sometimes you know it did not come within several ranks of the Secretary.

Senator JACKSON. There needs to be a code within a code.

Ambassador REISCHAUER. And you can tell by the code this was only cleared at a relatively low level, and therefore you should understand it in that way, and that this is not necessarily the personal opinion of an Under Secretary or the Secretary.

I think that maybe some codes within a code would be useful, as you say.

Senator MILLER. Could I ask a question?

How much of the time of your staff would you say is dedicated to reporting?

Ambassador REISCHAUER. It probably would vary with the different types of people.

You mean reporting in the sense of just getting information back that might be useful in Washington?

Senator MILLER. Preparation of a report to be sent back to Washington.

Ambassador REISCHAUER. Telegrams and reports, and so on?

Senator MILLER. Yes; to meet the requirements of reporting on the State Department end.

Ambassador REISCHAUER. It would be very hard to say. Between a quarter and a half of the time, perhaps.

But, you see, much of this reporting is really their own research work in keeping up with the field that they are following.

You take the man that is our contact man with the Government Party. He is constantly trying to learn as much as he can about the leaders of this Government Party, what they are thinking. He is talking with them all the time. And every once in a while, when he thinks he has enough information to be of value to Washington, he writes it up as a report.

But he has done this basically for his own knowledge.

Senator MILLER. Yes. Well, I would want to distinguish between what one does for his own knowledge and his own competence in carrying on his assigned duties there and the work that goes into getting that information back to Washington.

Ambassador REISCHAUER. Well, there is a third category. There are, you know, these routine requests for reporting on certain types of things, that you do fairly routinely. I should say in the economic field there is more of that than there would be in the political field.

I think the very fact of drafting it up into a message is itself a valuable exercise for the reporting officer, because sometimes a person can have a rather vague impression of the whole thing, but until he is forced to put it in good format, he has not thought it through himself.

Senator MILLER. You do not think a certain amount of that crystallization of his thinking could have already been gone through in the course of the staff meetings that are held? I would imagine that at one of his staff meetings or your own staff meetings, for this thing to be articulated properly, it would require some thinking through.

I would hope by the time it got around to a staff meeting with you he would have thought it through pretty well, and that anything beyond that for the purposes of Washington would not be required.

I am trying to come up with your idea on how this can be improved, because those of us who have served in the military at both the headquarters level and at the field level know that this thing can get out of hand.

And there have been time checks and all kinds of efficiency systems evolved to try to cope with this problem. But I must say that I was shocked when I first came across the information regarding the flood of paper that descends on Washington.

That means somebody out in the field has to do something. And I can see where you can even get bogged down. Sometimes these things can be eliminated, and sometimes they can be streamlined and sometimes there can be summaries rather than full reports.

There are a lot of those things that we have found in the military that can be eliminated. Somebody back here has to shuffle them around. And when you eliminate just one, there can be a chain reaction which can cut down a lot of time and overhead.

I just wonder if you have had occasion to review some of the reporting required of you and your staff. Have you tried to eliminate some of it, or streamline it?

Ambassador REISCHAUER. I am not aware of any large bulk of material that is not of value to ourselves in the drafting process. Of course, the staff meeting tends to be a fairly informal thing, with us. I try to get people to express their views and discuss them back and forth, rather than having canned reports, and so it serves a somewhat different function. It is an exchange of views, primarily.

I find, myself, the more routine reports of my staff are very useful to me. I keep them on my desk, and when I have a little time, I catch

up on them and read them, because there are lots of things I cannot follow in as much detail as they are following.

They are often eager to write these, actually, because it is their way of presenting the thing that they have discovered to the rest of us there, as well as back in Washington.

In almost every case where there has been a real attempt to cut down on this flow, there is somebody back in Washington that screams in agony when it does not come in any more.

Now, mighty often these are people down at the research level, who are doing the day-to-day work. I think it is very valuable to have a research backup in Washington as well as with us, where the papers are pretty well in detail.

Senator MILLER. In reporting to you, do you have them summarize their topics?

Ambassador REISCHAUER. Almost all of our longer reports come in with a summary statement at the beginning, and you can glance at that and decide whether you want to read the rest of the report.

With my time as tight as it is, I must admit I often let the thing go by with just the reading of the summary.

Senator MILLER. Would it be feasible, in lieu of some of these reports that go back to Washington, to merely indicate a summary, let's say, of a few points of what is contained in some of these studies, so that the people back here could then determine whether to ask you to send the whole report on or forget about it?

Ambasador REISCHAUER. Actually, as long as you have a pouch going back and forth all the time, it in itself is not a real problem. It is a problem of who is going to read it when it gets to this side.

And I suspect what happens here is what happens with us. The busier people will glance at summaries and put it aside, whereas the people who have the backup research function are the ones who are going to read it and appreciate it.

So I doubt very much if this does cut into your time very seriously, on this side, any more than it does with me there.

That is what I mean. It is a pragmatically worked out system, but I do not think we waste much time reading things that are not necessary to be read.

Senator MILLER. That certainly is one of our problems here, to figure out what to read. And I know that commanders have a time problem.

And granted that staff people love to write reports, because this is a good way of impressing the commander with your knowledge on something, I would hope they would save their time by writing summaries.

If you want to dig in, you can get them to give you the details. A nutshell approach saves time.

Ambassador REISCHAUER. We always have a summary on the front of a report there. In fact, in some cases the title is enough for you. You know you will not want to read the rest of it.

Senator JACKSON. Mr. Engberg?

Professor ENGBERG. I was much interested in your formal statement, about how you prepare for these staff meetings. I recalled, after reading that, an article Ambassador Matthews had put in the Foreign Service Journal about coordination, and I was wondering what you might give us as to your procedure.

Ambassador Matthews pointed out that there is serious danger in consulting with the top agencies, that you may not have coordination throughout the lower areas. And he suggested that the ambassador's task was finding out what was happening on all the lower levels, and coordinating. This gets into the area that we talked about once before—the danger of each agency giving its own view only.

What is your thinking as to the lower level type of coordination, so that you get the true picture when you have your top staff meeting?

Ambassador REISCHAUER. Yes. Of course, through the meetings of the sections, which bring together all these agencies that might have a somewhat related interest, we do have coordination at that level, and some of these agencies go to more than one of the staff meetings, as you can see in this paper.

So the problem is: How can I keep in touch with all of this? And it is a problem I felt very much.

When I first went there, I found that there was such a tendency for all authority to stem from the top down that if the Ambassador spoke, then no one else would speak. And this went away on down the line.

If I got the political counselor's views, I did not find out the view of the man who had argued with him at a lower level.

I have done my best to make everything go the other way around. In my own staff meetings, I never speak first. I always start with them, to bring up all the problems they want, and get them all talking, and I keep the Deputy Chief of Mission and myself to the very end, to pick up the points that have not been brought up.

This is just exactly a reversal of the procedure that I had found there. And I insisted I wanted to get the divergent views and not just the view of the economic or political section as decided at the very top. I wanted to have something of the argumentation that had gone on below on the very same thing.

This does not assure me that it always does come through, and I still have a feeling that I wish I had closer contact with the people down the line. But I think this is a problem, and would be a problem, in any large organization.

Senator JACKSON. I wanted to turn, if I might, to the matter of long-range planning in the embassies.

We have found that for one reason or another, generally speaking, the embassies have not been able to do this. Do you have the staff for this purpose?

First of all, do you see a need for a planning staff or planning group within the Embassy?

Ambassador REISCHAUER. I am not sure that I see a use for a separate planning staff here. I feel very strongly that the Ambassador and the top officers should themselves be thinking in long-range terms.

I just do not see how you could do a job of this sort if you do not have a sort of philosophy of history, of where this all fits in. You have to think in those terms, or you do not make any sense out of what you are doing from day to day.

I do not see how you can give this to another group who are going to be your philosophers, while you are the do-ers.

Senator JACKSON. You feel the operators should be the planners?

Ambassador REISCHAUER. I feel that way, and that is the reason I am very happy when I find some of our best officers writing long-term

think-pieces. What is happening in Japanese politics? We have had some very good papers of that sort.

Some of these may seem awfully far away from immediate administration. But I believe thinking of this sort is important. I did a paper last summer myself, trying to think through the whole thing, what we were really dealing with in roughly a 10-year period.

And one of our chief political officers did an extremely good analytical piece on the nature of the development of the Japanese parties, as to what was happening there long term, and so what we were going to have to deal with in the future.

The men who have the chief responsibility and the chief contact are the ones that are best able to do this, and I think we just have to reserve our own time to do this thing, as well as do the day-to-day work.

Senator JACKSON. Do you have the backup staff you need to help you in formulating long-term policies as you see them develop in your day-to-day operating experience?

In other words, you are at the top of the Embassy with your key people, and you sit around, and you are confronted daily with the host of problems that you have to meet.

Do you find the time to really sit down as a planning staff, as a planning group, with your key people?

Ambassador REISCHAUER. To get it on paper, you have to find some special time.

I did a big piece last summer, when I took myself a little vacation. I went away for about 10 days, and I sat down and did this. It was the only way you could do a job of that kind—come up with a long paper.

But actually I think we use our staff meeting very much for that purpose, because quite often we get away from the immediate issue to talk about the long-range implications of it and where we are going, and so I think there is a sort of oral tradition of this sort.

Here we are talking about this big problem, and where we stand in it, and our staff meeting does not therefore just stick to, "Well, here is a document, and how do we answer it?" I am very happy to get away from that and talk about the bigger issues.

Senator MILLER. What happens to that report when it comes back here? How long are the think-pieces?

Ambassador REISCHAUER. We get very interesting reactions here.

Senator MILLER. Where does it go? Does it go to a long-range planning staff?

Ambassador REISCHAUER. I presume the long-range planning staff looks at that.

I am very much interested to see that all up and down the line the officers over here will have read it, if it is something of real interest. It goes around to CINCPAC. People like that come back and say, "That was interesting. We think this is fine." And so on.

Senator JACKSON. I think we ought to point out that Ambassador Reischauer is rather unique. He is a scholar on all matters relating to the Far East, and Japan in particular.

Ambassador REISCHAUER. I come with a long-range interest in this particular area and problem; and therefore look at it in those terms.

Senator MILLER. But is there a long-range planning officer over here at State that would take something from someone in the Philippines and southwest Asia?

Ambassador REISCHAUER. Yes. The State Department's policy planning staff does that. There is a tendency for the policy planning staff to perhaps work more on crisis problems rather than noncrisis areas such as Japan.

Senator MILLER. How about long range? Do they not have long-range planning?

Ambassador REISCHAUER. As I think back over the State Department's history, they are always setting up groups that are going to think in terms of the long range, and they are always being brought closer and closer to the immediate present.

This has happened with various staffs I have watched over there. There is this danger.

Senator MILLER. But the State Department's policy planning staff is the one that has this function?

Senator JACKSON. They have the responsibility. The staff is headed by Walt W. Rostow.

Ambassador REISCHAUER. Right.

Senator JACKSON. Now, when you are able to get in a good paper on what you see the situation to be at present, and the direction it is going, and so on, do you find that a document of that importance gets to the Secretary of State and to the President?

Ambassador REISCHAUER. I am not aware that either of them has read these particular ones I had in my mind. I dare say if they did not see it, much of the thinking of it was transmitted to them in terms of conversation with other people at the top, who have read it. It certainly gets up to the Assistant Secretary level—things of that sort.

Senator JACKSON. Well, it seems to me when we have a good ambassador and a good embassy staff, they can be a very vital part of our policy planning. When an ambassador is in a country as important as Japan, he has an opportunity right on the scene to translate his day-to-day experience into what the direction should be for the future.

And the operator can be the best planner. I think this is something we need to really capitalize on.

Do we have a preapproved policy plan toward Japan that you follow?

Ambassador REISCHAUER. Yes; we have a paper. I forget whether it is revised every 2 years, or something of that sort. I remember when I first came in, a little over 2 years ago, they were in the process of just finishing one up, and they gave me a chance to read it and make some suggestions on it.

We are just going through another process of that sort now, I think primarily from the policy planning group back here in Washington. It has been over several months' time that they have been putting together something of this sort.

Senator JACKSON. Well, is this paper worked out in conjunction with you and your people?

Ambassador REISCHAUER. It goes back and forth between the desk officer in State and us, and they rewrite it and so on.

Senator JACKSON. What is the genesis of it? Do you start it?

Ambassador REISCHAUER. This past one, as I remember, was written up at the desk level here, originally.

I happened to be back here in November–December for a couple of weeks, and in between all the other things I was doing then, I read it and made quite extensive changes in it at white-hot speed at that moment. They did some further work, and then it came to us in Japan, and has been very much rewritten in our different sections. Then it has gone back here, and they are doing some further rewrite on what we did.

Senator JACKSON. Do you have a substantial influence in the final version in the Embassy staff?

Ambassador REISCHAUER. Oh, yes.

Senator JACKSON. And then when that process was completed, did the Secretary of State approve it, and did the President approve it?

Ambassador REISCHAUER. I am not sure at what level it gets final approval.

Senator JACKSON. But it is national policy?

Ambassador REISCHAUER. Yes. And what it turns out to be, then, is pretty well descriptive of what people think the situation is, and the thinking is at that moment.

It really does not plan too far into the future. But it is awfully useful for anybody coming in new to the situation to see a statement of what the thinking was as of that time.

Senator JACKSON. Do you find it adequate?

Ambassador REISCHAUER. I think it is fairly adequate; yes.

Actually, once you have done it, the people who have taken part in it find their minds going on, and they go beyond it fairly soon. So I do not find myself going back to, "What does it tell us to do?" because we have helped draft it up, and we should go beyond it as events unfold.

But I think it is very useful for the person who is only peripherally involved in the Japan picture, and therefore needs this for reference, or the man coming newly into the Japan scene.

Senator MILLER. How far in the future does it go?

Ambassador REISCHAUER. It does talk about the general future. I do not mean it does not go into the future, but as we move into the future ourselves, we begin revising it.

Senator MILLER. There are not two papers, one devoted to short range and the other to long range?

Ambassador REISCHAUER. No. And it is based on a fundamental assumption of what may happen over a 10-year period, just on the kinds of things we have been thinking through in these specific papers.

Professor TUFTS. When Miss Fosdick and I were in Japan last fall, we were told, if I remember correctly, that there was a planning paper for USIS, which neither the present USIS group nor its predecessor had had an adequate opportunity to participate in drafting. There was some feeling that more consultation with the Embassy, the USIS group in Tokyo, would have been helpful.

I take it this is not the situation in your relations with State.

Ambassador REISCHAUER. Well, they are now just in the process of revising the USIS paper "Country Plan," I think they call it. Our USIS man sent back one which he has written largely himself, I think, so they may feel a little differently right now. This was some months ago that you were there. Perhaps they had reference to the fact that certain elements in it, some overall statements of objectives

and so on, were dictated from Washington as of some time ago, and people in the field would perhaps prefer to phrase it differently.

I remember the U.S. forces, Japan, at one time commented, "Can't you say this better?" and that turned out to be the part that was from Washington, that we could not change. So maybe they were having reference to the fact that some of it was already set.

Professor ENGBERG. I was wondering if the Ambassador had any information on whether the Department of State gives the same consideration to other ambassadors.

Ambassador Reischauer is an expert in his field, and I can well see where they might seriously consider his recommendation on all these long-term programs.

Do you know at all from your acquaintanceship with other ambassadors and your various contacts whether or not the other embassies are given the same consideration on planning papers that your office is given?

Ambassador REISCHAUER. I had the impression they were, but not having had that extensive experience in the Foreign Service, I could not say.

Senator JACKSON. Returning to the issues of reporting and planning, when you have an important point to make, an important suggestion that you feel is very vital in our relations with Japan and therefore with the Far East, do you have any trouble getting that information to the highest levels that are necessary in order to take effective action?

Ambassador REISCHAUER. No. That is what I mean by a fairly pragmatically worked out system. Theoretically, the telegrams are all the same. Sometimes limited distribution will get it higher. But you use that usually for security reasons.

But you use the first person. If you say, "I did this," you see, this almost automatically brings it up to higher attention. So there are ways of drafting it.

I do not know if there is any rule book that describes this, but I have found in practice there are ways of getting higher attention, by the phrasing.

Senator JACKSON. Then, I expect, there are certain situations in which you feel the issues involved are such that it would be better to come to Washington?

Ambassador REISCHAUER. I have never had to do that.

Senator JACKSON. You have never had to do it. You have been able to handle matters through written communications for the most part?

Ambassador REISCHAUER. Well, there are many cases where you probably feel as though you could have done a better job if you came back here and talked directly with people.

Actually, this week I find myself having turned up quite by accident at a very opportune moment on a very important problem that I probably could not have handled as well in Tokyo as by being here.

Senator JACKSON. Under Secretary of State Harriman indicated, in his testimony to this committee, that if our ambassadors could come in more often, this at least would help the reporting problem, and it would be more useful both to the Department of State and to the ambassadors themselves.

Do you have any comment on that?

Ambassador REISCHAUER. I have come back on an average of between 6 months and a year. I have found it very useful to come back. I am not sure it would be more useful to come back more often than that, because I think these messages on the whole are very adequate.

I am always very much impressed by how much aware they are of, you know, that message you sent, if you sent it in the right form. And I think it is just about as good as if you were on the spot.

Senator MILLER. What about the key members of the staff coming back? Do they do that?

Ambassador REISCHAUER. Very little.

Senator MILLER. What about the comments from the headquarters here, or the State Department's policy planning staff going out there?

Ambassador REISCHAUER. We do not see too much of the policy planning staff, that I am aware of. I think I would like to see them more often.

Senator MILLER. Do you think it would be helpful to have the policy planning staff come out to the field once in a while?

Ambassador REISCHAUER. Yes. For instance, I have not been able to persuade Mr. Rostow to come out. He promised me one time, and was not able to do it because other crisis areas absorbed his time.

Senator MILLER. But how about one or two of his right-hand men coming out?

Ambassador REISCHAUER. I think it would be very good.

I do not remember cases of top people in policy planning coming out. It may be just a slip in my memory. We do see a great number of other people. I am very happy to see them. I think it is very useful.

We have a constant flow of Government officials through Tokyo, State Department people and others who are involved in foreign policy.

Senator MILLER. Probably too many.

Ambassador REISCHAUER. One could think that way, but I do not think it can be too many.

Senator JACKSON. Depending on the quality.

Senator MILLER. But you would like to see somebody from the policy planning office?

Ambassador REISCHAUER. Yes; that would be useful, I am sure.

Senator JACKSON. To return for a moment to the policy guidance that you get, do you find that it is clear and unequivocal, so that you can pretty well carry out your duties and responsibilities as Ambassador? Or is there a lot of improvising and are there ad hoc arrangements that do not always leave you with clear-cut guidance as to the course you should pursue?

Ambassador REISCHAUER. It is usually clear cut, I think. Sometimes it is slow in arriving, because so many of our important problems in Japan are interdepartmental problems—economic ones involving Commerce, Agriculture, Fisheries, things like that, and then the military.

Senator JACKSON. On the fundamental questions? I realize an issue will come up in a specific area that does not actually change your broad general directive. Do you find that you are pretty clear in your own mind as to the course you should pursue, based on the written policy statement?

Ambassador REISCHAUER. Yes; I think so. But that may be simply because I have a clear idea in my own mind. I think our general statement is quite clear, our overall policies, and so on.

Senator JACKSON. This is one of the things that has concerned us. For a while I think the government tended to be too precise and formal on these things, and now there may be a tendency to go the other way, to improvise and to be a little too flexible.

Ambassador REISCHAUER. Well, perhaps we have a somewhat different situation in Japan from what you have in many countries of the world. We do not have a rapidly changing situation there. You have to have an overall interpretation of where things are likely to go over a certain period of time, and I do not think in Washington or Tokyo there has been any fundamental revision of that general attitude.

This does allow, then, an ambassador within that general framework to have his own fairly clear-cut ideas of just how it should be played.

We do not have a change from year to year because of some revolution or change of leadership in the country. So I do not think this would be a typical case, at all.

I think you would have much more serious problems, let's say, in the countries of Southeast Asia, where you might have to have a fairly rapid change because of a great upheaval.

Senator MILLER. Could I pursue that one idea you have had?

You have indicated you would like to see more of the policy planning staff people come out in the field. What about their counterparts in some of the other agencies? For example, from Commerce, coming out. Do they do that?

Ambassador REISCHAUER. Yes; we get people like that all the time.

Senator MILLER. So the liaison on a visitation basis is pretty good except when it comes to the policy planning office in the State Department?

Ambassador REISCHAUER. Yes. Specifically, I do not remember those people coming out very much. We do have a large number of people from Defense, Commerce—all of the departments that would be involved in things of this sort.

Senator JACKSON. Turning to the defense area, which must tie in so closely with our foreign policy objectives and operations, what is your relationship with the military, and how do you in general get along? Do you have any comments on that?

Ambassador REISCHAUER. This is the most important coordination problem we have in Japan, without a shadow of a doubt. We have 45,000 men in uniform there, which gives you a population of over a hundred thousand on the military side in Japan.

And the most difficult and crucial aspect of our relations with Japan is with defense, because this is the controversial issue of Japanese politics, making this our most difficult problem. And so liaison between the Embassy and the U.S. forces in Japan is absolutely essential.

Actually, we have an extremely close relationship. We have a country team which formalizes this relationship, but the essence of it is the fact that the commander of the U.S. forces in Japan—up through this month it is Jake Smart, an extremely fine man—he and I are in very close contact.

It is like the traditional school, one person at each end of a log. We are two people at each end of a sofa, and we get together all of the time and talk over each of our problems, and when we have staff work, we have a country team meeting that comes every 2 weeks.

But we never dream of doing anything that involves the other without consultation. He gives me his speeches, if he is going to make a speech, or anything like that. He comes and tells me his problems, and I discuss mine with him.

Senator JACKSON. And this runs pretty well down through all the levels?

Ambassador REISCHAUER. Down through the levels, the same kind of very close relationship exists. We draft an important message to go to Washington, sent ostensibly from the Embassy. Just the day I left there was a very important message coming out. It did not say "country team" or anything like that. There were two colonels and a Navy captain backstopping me on this, coming over from the headquarters of the U.S. forces in Japan, because it deeply involved them. This is the kind of relationship we have.

Senator JACKSON. I am certainly glad to hear that, because we have had some experiences where Defense and State get rather out of touch—take for example the Skybolt problem. And certainly in Japan you have a whole series of sensitive areas, in which the military are involved on a day-to-day basis, and that have of necessity to be closely coordinated with the job you are doing.

Ambassador REISCHAUER. Yes. We have a third element in that, and that is our MAAG, of course, the Military Aid Assistance Group, which is, according to the charts, part of the Embassy. But it has to have very close relationships with the U.S. forces in Japan.

And so there is a three-way coordination. But the kind of thing they are in on tends to be more of a technical nature, weapons and that sort of thing. There is very, very close staff coordination, but it is not as crucial as the coordination between General Smart and myself on things that have an overall relationship with Japan.

Senator JACKSON. You find it is the quality of the people as much as anything that makes the difference?

Ambassador REISCHAUER. This is the basic thing, of course. You cannot have a fine organization if you do not have the right people, and if you have the right people, you do not really need such a detailed organization.

Senator MILLER. I hate to have to leave. It has been nice to get acquainted with you.

(At this point Senator Miller withdrew from the hearing room.)

Ambassador REISCHAUER. We have the danger of General Smart and myself getting together without sufficient staff behind us, so we had to go back to a more formal type of meeting so that it could be properly recorded.

Professor TUFTS. In terms of developing our relations with Japan, what are the most important tools with which you have to work? I suppose they are economic to some extent, and military to some extent, and informational to some extent. Do you feel, as you have watched this over the past couple of years, that we are making effective use of these tools?

What I am leading to is: What if anything do you see as the problems in making better use of these instruments for influencing relations?

Ambassador REISCHAUER. I think the policy is just as with any complicated problem, to subordinate the minor to the major.

We have loads of, let's say, minor economic problems, that help to roil things up, and therefore make major political relationships more difficult. You have got to keep them in perspective. It is awfully hard to do, because each one of these belongs to somebody's particular area of administrative control over here, or political concern, and so on.

Just the coordination of these things is a very difficult thing, if you are thinking in terms of specific instrumentalities for improving the relationship.

And of course, economic problems are very much involved. For instance, cotton textiles is a very good case in point. This can cause a great deal of ill will—this of course goes both ways—over what turns out to be a very small item in the huge overall trade.

On the military side, the relationship of our military to the Japanese public is a vitally important thing. Very fortunately, our military is very much aware of that. If we had military men who were not aware of this public relations problem, we could have endless trouble. But we are very fortunate in having from the top on down in our military in Japan people who seem to be extremely well aware of this, and work awfully hard at it.

Perhaps the most important instrumentality is the information side, or cultural exchange, or whatever you want to call it, or intellectual contact.

People do not like to use the word "intellectual," but this is perhaps the most important aspect of it there, the USIS and all the aspects of its activity.

But you have the U.S. military in the same effort to have an overall influence. And I should say our whole Embassy is really doing a sort of USIS job. There are ways in which we could make it more effective, but as long as we all realize this is important——

Senator JACKSON. The military insofar as their base commanders are concerned—are they fully indoctrinated before they come, and then after they get over there, on rather a continuous basis, to know what the problem is in their community, what approach they should take toward the local citizens, and so on, this being one of the troublesome problems that you have to face?

Ambassador REISCHAUER. I dare say there is good indoctrination before they come. I am not sure on that point. I think perhaps the main thing is the leadership of the commanding general. He understands it and helps indoctrinate people on down the line.

Of course, the chief men in every service are very important, and we are very fortunate in that. And people down the line begin to take the lead from those above them.

Professor TUFTS. I remember that you attached a great deal of importance to the point of communications in your book, in 1955, *Wanted: An Asian Policy*. And in that book you made a strong case for the importance of having people not only speak the language but understand the culture enough to be able to express what they have to say

in a way which would make it understandable to the people they are talking to.

To what extent do you think your staff meets these requirements now, in the USIS staff and other staffs that are involved in this?

Ambassador REISCHAUER. Well, you probably never achieve perfection in this. But we have made a lot of advances. The Embassy has a fairly high degree of linguistic skills. We have built that side up quite considerably.

You cannot go too far. You want a balance of people who are not deeply in the Japanese scene, too, in key places, also. I think you have to have that balance.

So the Embassy itself I think is fairly well balanced that way. Perhaps USIS could use a great deal more linguistic skills. They just are not available as yet. We have a pretty good training program for the young men, in rather large numbers.

Professor TUFTS. That was the next point I wanted to raise. This committee has been quite interested in training problems.

You say you have a training program. Do you think it is a good one? Or could it be improved in some ways?

I wanted to ask what sort of a training program would in your judgment best prepare the young officers for their work.

Ambassador REISCHAUER. There has been a lot of experience behind this. The one problem is the problem of weeding people out of this kind of work who do not have the real talents for it. And we keep setting up a system.

Recently we started a system whereby a person would have a trial period there, and a trial period in the field, to see if he is really suited for work in Japan and has linguistic skills worth developing.

After he has proved both of them, you give him a full course. The only danger is the one of human frailty, where everybody wants to be so kind to everybody else that it is awfully hard to bust a person out of the system. There may be sort of a black spot on his record. But it is not a kindness to him to keep him in if he does not have the talents for it.

Professor TUFTS. In this same book of yours, you said that:

> The specialist who learns the native language and becomes an expert in the native culture and psychology is likely to find his accomplishments hindrances rather than aids to his promotion.
> Our Foreign Service—

you said there—

> is geared to produce fine mixers with other Americans rather than to produce the all-important contact men with Asians.

Ambassador REISCHAUER. When I wrote that, I think it was descriptive of the system. I trust this is being changed. But there is always this prejudice. It is a problem.

Professor TUFTS. What does this suggest to you about tours of duty and about the need for opportunities for people who do want to specialize in a particular language and culture and so on? Do you think we need people in the Foreign Service who will spend a large part of their lives working on Japanese matters?

Ambassador REISCHAUER. There are certain areas where I think it is necessary, absolutely necessary. Japan is probably an outstanding example. Korea is a place where if we had more of that, we probably would be in a much sounder position than we are today.

The China area—of course, we do not have much of a China area to deal with—has always been in the same position exactly. That is, these are countries that have very different languages from ours, and really utilize them as a medium of communication.

India, after all, uses English. Africa still is using western languages. And you do not have quite the same problem that you do in the Far East.

There used to be a special Japan and China Service, back before the war. It was necessary in those days. I think it will be necessary for a long time in the future. That means people who are expected to spend a much higher percentage of their career in one area than is true of the Service as a whole.

Professor TUFTS. Do you have such men on your staff there?

Ambassador REISCHAUER. Oh, yes, we have lots of them. And we are training men all the time. I get the impression that half of their foreign service would be spent in contact with the country of their special interest.

Professor TUFTS. And do you find that they are getting promotions adequately?

Ambassador REISCHAUER. I think so; yes. The really able ones are; yes. I think there has been a change in that regard.

Senator JACKSON. Senator Pell?

Senator PELL. Thank you. Excuse me for being late. I had another meeting.

In connection with your table of organization, I notice that you have the military attachés reporting directly to you, not to MAAG and then to you. Some thought is being given to the idea that the MAAG commander's office should be combined with the position of Defense attaché? What is your view on that?

Ambassador REISCHAUER. MAAG is a very specialized job with us, a highly technical job, and their problem of relationship there is between them and the U.S. forces, Japan.

We have a large military there. They have a very close working relationship. In the chart they come under us, but the three of us work very closely together.

Among the various service attachés in a country like Japan, where you have the large military establishment already there, you have a somewhat anomalous position. They tend to be just liaison officers, to help liaison between these various elements.

Senator PELL. Who serves as the liaison?

Ambassador REISCHAUER. The service attachés.

Actually, I think someone should look into the whole problem of what the function of a service attaché is in an embassy in a country where there is a large American military establishment that quite overshadows the service attachés.

I think the military itself are beginning to think about this problem, because obviously U.S. forces, Japan, has taken over a large part of the function that would normally be in the hands of a service attaché.

Senator PELL. This is a question I had hoped to lead into, because I had been of the view that the commanding officer at MAAG should also be the Defense Department attaché as well, and when this would happen, there would be happier relationships with both the embassy staff and perhaps some of the other people.

Ambassador REISCHAUER. It is a perfectly conceivable concept, except that we have somebody even more important, and that is the commander of the U.S. forces in Japan, who is really the Defense Department representative there.

And for anything of a military nature, and as I was pointing out earlier, the most difficult problems we have are of a military nature, since this is a crucial area, in Japan—on things of this sort my relationship with the commander of U.S. forces in Japan is the important thing.

Senator PELL. Which is the senior Defense attaché?

Ambassador REISCHAUER. We do not have one. The Naval attaché is responsible for the maintenance of all the facilities for the rest of them; but he is not over them.

Senator PELL. When you get into the other islands around Japan, the Ryukyus and others, do they come under you?

Ambassador REISCHAUER. The Ryukyu Islands are a great problem for us, but they do not come under us. That is probably where the problem exists.

It is a Department of the Army area, and the commanding general is directly under the Army, the High Commissioner. And yet the great political problem is the fact that there are 900,000 Japanese-speaking people who regard themselves as Japanese, and therefore this is a built-in major problem between us and Japan.

So the Japanese and we have a very special relationship over the Ryukyu Islands. But we have a rather curious three-cornered situation as a result, because the High Commissioner has his channel back to Army and not, of course, to State.

Senator PELL. What is the general view in Japan with regard to the development of the natural normal trading relationship between the industrial area of Japan and the agrarian area of China?

Ambassador REISCHAUER. Japan has an emotional feeling about, "Here is this great mass of people next door, and it is only natural to have them as customers of ours," and so on.

The general public has leaned in that direction, and there is a great tendency and desire for not only trade relations but diplomatic relations. This is a great embarrassment to the Government there, because they try to cooperate with us in the general free world stand. They have therefore taken what they call a forward-looking attitude toward trade with China.

Actually, the people who know much about it do not expect any great trade to develop, because the Chinese have not developed an economy that can trade with Japan very much. They could absorb endless Japanese things, but they do not have anything to pay with, either in the way of foreign exchange or goods.

I think the Japanese Government feels that the best way to educate the Japanese public on this situation—that there is not very much in China trade—is to give enough rope, so that they can find out through experience.

Senator PELL. Who do the Japanese people consider their natural enemy?

Ambassador REISCHAUER. Russia. This is normal, sort of emotionally built into them. They have felt that way about the Russians for a long time.

Senator PELL. Like we used to consider the British Empire in our first century?

Ambassador REISCHAUER. Even a more hostile feeling.

Senator PELL. But they are more hostile to the Soviets than to the Chinese?

Ambassador REISCHAUER. Yes; it is a traditional thing that actually goes back about 150 years, this attitude toward Russia. And the end of the war experience was a very unpleasant one, where the Russians came in just to take advantage of our victory.

Senator PELL. But the feeling toward the Chinese is one of—what?

Ambassador REISCHAUER. Well, it is a very complicated one. I used to say there is a guilt complex in it. China is their Greece and Rome, you know, source of ancient civilization, and they have a sort of sentimental feeling about it.

On top of that, they have a sort of guilt complex about having ruined China in modern years. Unquestionably there is a certain race element involved. The Chinese seem more like natural people and they share a lot culturally with them. They have a strong emotional bias in their favor. At the same time, they have underneath it all a sort of contempt.

Senator PELL. And what is the view with regard to Formosa China with its 10 million people and Mainland China with its 750 million people?

Ambassador REISCHAUER. For a long time the Japanese disregarded the Formosans completely. More recently, they have developed a much more healthy awareness of Formosa, and the fact is that their trade with Formosa has tended to be larger than their trade with the continent.

And now they are developing a real pride in the fact that their great advance is largely a result of Japan's investment in Formosa in the colonial period, and they have a pride in that the Formosan population is very definitely pro-Japanese, one of the few colonial populations that have come out with a nostalgic love for their former rulers.

Senator PELL. I remember going to Columbia University—we had a course for naval officers, and we used Formosa as our case study for military government. We were taught while they did not like the Japanese too much, they accepted them. If there were any people they disliked more, it was the Mainland Chinese. This was Navy doctrine in 1944.

Ambassador REISCHAUER. A lot of this has been a sort of subtle way of showing disapproval of the existing governments. I do not think they love the Japanese that much.

Senator PELL. One final question is in connection with the proposed Foreign Service Academy. I was wondering if you had any views one way or the other.

Ambassador REISCHAUER. I just cannot see any point to it, myself, because I do not think it is that technical a subject that should be boiled down and cut off from the rest of the thing.

In fact, I thought the whole effort of the Foreign Service was to draw people into it with as broad experience as possible. A few years ago, it was standard policy to not encourage persons to come directly out of college into the Foreign Service. They wanted people to have a broader experience than that.

Senator PELL. They wanted the boys from the East to go West, and the boys from the West to go East?

Ambassador REISCHAUER. And some other kinds of contacts, more than just the academic one, before you went into Foreign Service work.

I think that is all very sound. Certainly you do not want the academic experience of a specialized kind of academy that cuts them off from the rest.

I just cannot see it in those terms, unless it means an in-service training for people after they have gone in.

Senator PELL. Have you any views as to the consensus of people within the career service with regard to the Foreign Service Academy?

Ambassador REISCHAUER. I can give you a guess as to this from my personal friends. I think it would be disapproving.

Senator PELL. I would agree with you.

Senator JACKSON. For clarification, when we talk about the academy, the initial proposal was for an undergraduate academy, and now there is the proposal for a graduate academy.

Senator PELL. Yes. I am talking about the graduate academy.

Ambassador REISCHAUER. I would have a rather negative view toward this concept.

Senator JACKSON. The truth of the matter is that this type of postgraduate work is available in our existing institutions of higher learning, or can be initiated there, and then you have the opportunity of going to the various centers throughout the country.

Ambassador REISCHAUER. If I had the problem of training people for it, I would want to get them scattered widely and then bring them into the Foreign Service.

Senator PELL. I think one thing that would be really beneficial to them after spending 15 years in the Foreign Service would be to get them sent out to St. Louis.

Ambassador REISCHAUER. I think it would be very good to give them sabbatical leave from the Foreign Service in something of this sort, but not in a Foreign Service Academy.

Senator JACKSON. I think Mr. Engberg had a question or two.

Professor ENGBERG. I have been interested over quite a period of time in this matter of personality in the ambassador's office and this matter of legal control. There is a sort of contrasting type of thing, here.

We run into situations such as the Ambassador talks about in Japan, where they have the same legal situations as in other embassies so far as responsibility to State and to Washington, and then we run into other areas where some of our other testimony has indicated that things have not worked nearly as smoothly.

So I have a couple of questions I would like to have you consider. I am not at all sure that they are really within your area of knowledge.

Do the different agencies here in Washington, when they send out people, throughout all this great listing of folks that you have on your

country team—do they make any attempt to deliberately select individuals who are not only trained as persons but trained technically to fit that particular country?

Ambassador REISCHAUER. Some of them do, very definitely.

We had a new attaché recently who came in very well prepared, I thought, who had been working on these problems back in Treasury here, and was well grounded in what he was going to run into in Tokyo.

Professor ENGBERG. Is he well grounded in the area of his work so far as Japan is concerned?

Ambassador REISCHAUER. Yes. That is what I mean. He is quite familiar with these things. I would not say this is true in all cases, but I think quite a few of the people who have come are very well grounded.

Professor ENGBERG. Another question along that same line: So many of these agencies that are set up by statutory authority send out people that you work with in your country team. Then you take over your position and, to use the terms of the President, you are supposed to be in complete "coordination and supervision" of that program.

And I think Mr. Herter at one time used the term "vehicle of decision." I took that directly from an article that Mr. Herter wrote.

Your control over your country team, then, is much more of personal relations than it is of legal control?

Ambassador REISCHAUER. This is not really a country team, what we have here. This is all built in as some things attached to the Embassy. So I think we have a considerable amount of even legal control, because these things have to go out through the Embassy channels of communication.

Senator JACKSON. You operate under President Kennedy's letter, too.

Professor ENGBERG. The point I was getting at, Senator Jackson, is that the Congress has established a lot of these areas. Some of these areas are really not directly under the President. They become the Ambassador's domain when they end up in Japan.

Senator JACKSON. I think the real problem here is that while these people—like a Treasury attaché—are attached to the Embassy, you do not have the control over their efficiency reports, their promotions, and so on. Therefore you confront the very human problem: where does the particular employee look? Does he look to our Ambassador? Does he look to his superior in the States?

Is this not part of the problem?

I assume, on the other hand, that if a given employee or representative of Treasury or Commerce or any of the other departments fails to measure up, a letter from the Ambassador indicating that he just has not conducted himself properly over here, has not done a real good job, is not going to help him within his own department.

But there are problems where the agencies' own ideas on a given policy conflict with those of the State Department, so the tendency of the employee or representative, I would think, would be to follow the lead of his own department or agency.

In that particular situation this makes your problem a difficult one in exercising proper managerial control.

Ambassador REISCHAUER. Yes. I see the problem in theory. But I can only say in theory, because I cannot remember any example of anything like that. You are assuming that one of these boxes represents a group in Washington that now has a very different policy.

Senator JACKSON. I think what it gets down to is that Ambassador Reischauer's leadership has been such, and his attitude toward his people has been such, that the ordinary or normal technical and legal problems that might appear have not appeared because of the way he has handled things.

Professor ENGBERG. That is exactly the point, Senator Jackson.

Ambassador REISCHAUER. I have never felt any distinction between the people that belong in these boxes and the people that belong in our own boxes here.

Senator JACKSON. That is perhaps just the reason why it works.

Professor ENGBERG. We have been talking about staffing, and here is an almost perfect example of what we would have State set up in areas in terms of personality and control and getting results.

And when you start looking at the boxes and the legal type of thing, you say, "Well, the ambassador doesn't have any real control over this, but it works because of the type of staffing that has been done."

That is the point I was interested in bringing out.

Senator JACKSON. I think it is a very good point.

Ambassador REISCHAUER. Of course, we could have a much more serious problem with the U.S. forces in Japan, where there is no even theoretical subordination there. If we had a real divergence of opinion there, I think we would be in real trouble.

We have avoided any feuds, and we have fortunately seen things the same way. In getting a new man, if it turns out he has very divergent views from myself, then I think we would have a real problem of coordination there, at which point I think the only possible solution is a reference back to Washington, and Washington would have to decide to change one or the other in that case.

Senator JACKSON. Yes.

Incidentally, is there any interchange on appointments of that importance, which involves not just the ordinary military command requirement? Are there consultations with State in this respect?

Ambassador REISCHAUER. Not that I am aware of in this regard. I just hear of the fact that General Preston has taken General Smart's place.

Senator JACKSON. As you may know, under the stimulus of hearings before the predecessor to this subcommittee, a State-Defense exchange program was started. We encouraged this several years ago—a program between State and Defense, wherein officers from DOD go over to work in State, and vice versa. And we have tried to impress upon both departments the importance of this and other coordinating efforts.

I just wondered: In a case like this, it seems to me that the primary job of an officer going out there is to have a full comprehension of diplomatic and political problems.

Ambassador REISCHAUER. They have tried to cooperate in the following way. I think they have chosen the man without consultation with us, but General LeMay was out when this was announced, and I said to him, "Can't you get your new man here in plenty of time for this overlap with General Smart?"

Senator JACKSON. Is this an Air Force job?

Ambassador REISCHAUER. It is an Air Force job, because the chief job there is Air Force. The commander of the Fifth Force is concurrently commander of the U.S. forces in Japan.

Senator JACKSON. They have a large naval establishment?

Ambassador REISCHAUER. It is, but it has somehow been made an Air Force thing.

I said to LeMay, "Can't we have a big overlap there?" And he said, "Yes; we will see General Preston comes out there," because I wanted him to observe Smart and the attitudes he has taken and the contacts he has made. I thought it would be very helpful to him to get the thing off in the right way.

Senator JACKSON. We might close on this question: In your fine book, *Wanted: An Asian Policy*, you state:

> Why surrender the offensive to communism? The defensive can never win in Asia; only the offensive can, and, by all that we believe in, it rightly belongs to us.

Do you think that we are making any progress in this direction?

Ambassador REISCHAUER. I think we could be more on the offensive than we are in many places. I certainly have tried to take the offensive in Japan.

I spend most of my time—it is a strange attack I am making, but I am making an attack on classical Marxism. That is our real enemy there. And I never miss an opportunity to take a dig at it, although the word is never mentioned.

But it is, "Let's talk of a new view of history."

The whole thing is, "You know, these are the guys that are really out of date, and we are the wave of the future," and this kind of thing.

So I am continually on the offensive, and they recognize it as such. They always refer to it as the "Kennedy-Reischauer offensive." I am very flattered to be hyphenated there.

Professor TUFTS. What about in Asia generally?

Ambassador REISCHAUER. Well, I still think in many places we too much give ourselves the image of defense rather than the offense in the sense of establishing prosperity, freedom for people, and eventually democracy, rather than just sitting back and trying to hold off the other people, who are on the offensive.

It is more a frame of mind for yourself, often, but I think the whole country sometimes has this difficulty.

When you look at America from abroad, you keep wondering why Americans are so worried and pessimistic. Ask any Japanese what has happened in the last few years, and he will say, "We are making terrific progress as opposed to the other side."

Senator PELL. Along the lines of that same thought, I was wondering what the Ambassador's reaction is to the term "counterinsurgency," which to me is an unfortunate term, because our Nation was born in insurgency, and we encourage insurgency of the right kind.

Ambassador REISCHAUER. I have not thought in terms of that particular thing, but that is a good example of the way we approach this problem.

Senator JACKSON. On behalf of the committee, Mr. Ambassador, I certainly want to express to you our appreciation for your fine statement, and the helpful counsel and advice you have given us. We are very grateful.

Thank you very much.

(Whereupon, at 10:30 a.m., the subcommittee adjourned, subject to call of the Chair.)

EXHIBIT 1

ORGANIZATIONAL CHART - AMERICAN EMBASSY, TOKYO, JAPAN

July 1, 1963



NOTE:
Dotted lines indicate subordination for purposes of coordination within the Embassy of agencies representing branches of the United States Government other than the Department of State.

ADMINISTRATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY

EXHIBIT 2

ORGANIZATIONAL CHART - AMERICAN EMBASSY AND AFFILIATED AGENCIES, TOKYO, JAPAN

July 1, 1963



EXHIBIT 3

Personnel strength summary, 1952–63, American Embassy and affiliated agencies, Tokyo, Japan

[Figures as of June 30 each year]

I. COUNTRY SUMMARY

	1963		1962		1961		1960		1959		1958	
	American	Local	American	Local	American	Local	merican	Local	American	Local	American	Local
State (all programs)	213	304	217	315	214	322	219	318	218	313	209	305
USIS	46	321	41	327	46	337	47	350	48	355	49	359
AID	6	19	4	17	11	22	29	32	29	35	32	34
Affiliated agencies	83	63	74	52	72	47	64	44	58	45	57	46
Military attachés	37	21	41	22	46	21	43	21	40	19	40	18
MAAG/Japan	167	165	148	165	196	200	210	203	231	199	244	186
Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission	38	890	44	938	40	948	49	954	48	895	48	827
Grand total	590	1,783	569	1,836	625	1,897	661	1,922	672	1,861	679	1,775

	1957		1956		1955		1954		1953		1952	
	American	Local	American	Local	American	Local	American	Local	American	Local	American	Local
State (all programs)	221	306	221	314	209	320	205	277	233	358	196	313
USIS	58	388	57	367	48	305	46	293	82	361	52	417
AID	36	34	30	32	21	22						
Affiliated agencies	72	50	64	46	60	40	45	14	41	16	1	0
Military attachés	35	16	37	15	37	15	38	14	44	13		
MAAG/Japan	332	217	318	255								
Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission	46	812	42	806	52	730						
Grand total	800	1,823	769	1,835	427	1,432	334	598	400	748	249	730

Personnel strength summary, 1952–63, American Embassy and affiliated agencies, Tokyo, Japan—Continued

II. AMERICAN EMBASSY, TOKYO

	1963		1962		1961		1960		1959		1958	
	American	Local	American	Local	American	Local	American	Local	American	Local	American	Local
State Department:												
1. Complement positions:												
Executive section	15	2	14	2	13	2	12	2	12	2	9	1
Political section	33	23	34	24	32	24	35	24	37	22	38	22
Economic section	25	25	25	25	22	21	23	21	21	19	22	19
Consular section	13	35	16	33	19	33	[1] 22	33	20	36	21	36
Administrative section	51	131	49	134	41	138	42	137	42	133	35	129
Subtotal	137	216	138	218	127	218	134	217	132	212	125	207
2. Noncomplement positions:												
Marine guards	10	0	10	0	10	0	11	0	11	0	11	0
Foreign Buildings Office	1	0			1	4	2	3	2	3	2	3
FSI Language School	21	8	21	8	20	8	14	8	14	8	12	7
Refugee relief program												
Subtotal	32	8	31	8	31	12	27	11	27	11	25	10
U.S. Information Service	35	187	32	189	35	195	36	199	34	204	35	206
Agency for International Development	6	19	4	17	11	22	29	32	29	35	32	34
Affiliated agencies:												
Atomic Energy Commission	4	0	3	0	3	0	5	0	4	0	3	0
Department of Agriculture	5	10	5	6	5	5	4	5	4	5	5	5
Federal Aviation Agency	6	2	5	1	5	1	4	1	5	2	4	2
Foreign Broadcast Information Service	6	24	6	25	7	25	7	25	6	25	7	28
General Accounting Office	33	0	29	0	26	0	23	0	19	0	20	0
Department of Justice:												
Immigration and Naturalization Service	3	3	3	3	3	3	2	3	1	2	1	0
Federal Bureau of Investigation	5	0	5	0	5	0	5	0	4	0	4	0
Office of Alien Property									1	1	1	1
Maritime Administration	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
National Institutes of Health	2	1										
National Science Foundation	3	3	3	3	3	3						
Department of Commerce:												
U.S. Trade Center		5										
U.S. Travel Service	1	3	1	2								
Treasury Department:												
Office of International Finance	3	1	3	1	3	1	3	1	3	1	3	1
Bureau of Customs	5	3	5	3	6	2	5	2	5	2	4	2
GSA: Emergency Procurement Service												

Special programs	78	57	70	46	68	42	60	39	54	40	54	41			
Subtotal, affiliated agencies	78	57	70	46	68	42	60	39	54	40	54	41			
Military attachés:															
Army	8	0	13	0	17	0	16	0	17	8	18		8		
Navy	21	21	20	22	17	21	13	21	11	6	11		5		
Air	8	0	8	0	12	0	14	0	12	5	11		5		
Subtotal	37	21	41	22	46	21	43	21	40	19	40		18		
MAAG/Japan	167	164	147	164	189	198	204	201	224	196	233		170		
Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1		2		
Grand total, Tokyo	493	673	464	665	508	709	534	721	541	719	545		688		

See footnote, p. 231.

Personnel strength summary, 1952–63, American Embassy and affiliated agencies, Tokyo, Japan—Continued

	1957		1956		1955		1954		1953		1952	
	American	Local	American	Local	American	Local	American	Local	American	Local	American	Local
State Department:												
1. Complement positions:												
Executive section	8	1	9	2	9	2	7	1	5	1	3	0
Political section	36	30	26	27	26	28	22	25	26	34	18	30
Economic section	26	19	25	17	[2] 23	[2] 18	34	27	46	40	33	18
Consular section	20	33	20	29	23	31	23	28	28	31	25	32
Administrative section	46	125	47	121	48	125	45	106	64	133	59	117
Subtotal	136	208	127	196	129	204	131	187	169	239	138	197
2. Noncomplement positions:												
Marine guards	11	0	11	0	11	0	13	0	10	0	10	0
Foreign Buildings Office	3	3	2	2	1	2	2	1	2	0	----	----
FSI Language School	12	8	14	5	6	5	3	0	----	----	----	----
Refugee relief program	1	0	8	17	9	15	5	1	----	----	----	----
Subtotal	27	11	35	24	27	22	23	2	12	0	10	----
U.S. Information Service	39	226	37	190	29	156	32	146	57	164	38	208
Agency for International Development	36	34	30	32	[2] 21	[2] 22	----	----	----	----	----	----
Affiliated agencies:												
Atomic Energy Commission	6	5	5	5	4	3	----	----	----	----	----	----
Department of Agriculture	5	2	11	2	9	2	5	2	2	1	----	----
Federal Aviation Agency	7	16	7	16	7	14	----	----	----	----	----	----
Foreign Broadcast Information Service	20	0	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----
General Accounting Office	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----
Department of Justice:												
Immigration and Naturalization Service	4	0	2	0	1	0	2	0	2	1	----	----
Federal Bureau of Investigation	1	2	2	0	4	2	7	6	9	8	----	----
Office of Alien Property	2	2	3	2	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----
Maritime Administration	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----
National Institutes of Health	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----
National Science Foundation	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----
Department of Commerce:												
U.S. Trade Center	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----
U.S. Travel Service	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----
Treasury Department:												
Office of International Finance	3	1	3	1	8	1	4	0	3	0	1	0
Bureau of Customs	4	2	3	2	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----
GSA: Emergency Procurement Service	17	6	25	6	22	6	24	6	22	6	----	----
Special programs	----	----	----	----	2	0	3	0	3	0	----	----
Subtotal, affiliated agencies	69	36	61	34	57	28	45	14	41	16	1	0

Military attachés:												
Army	16	7	18	7	14	7	17	6	19	6	----	----
Navy	8	4	8	4	8	4	9	4	9	4	----	----
Air	11	5	11	4	15	4	12	4	16	3	----	----
Subtotal	35	16	37	15	37	15	38	14	44	13	----	----
MAAG/Japan	332	217	318	255	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----
Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission	2	1	1	1	1	1	----	----	----	----	----	----
Grand total, Tokyo	676	749	646	747	301	448	269	363	323	432	187	405

See footnote, p. 231.

Personnel strength summary, 1952–63, American Embassy and affiliated agencies, Tokyo, Japan—Continued

III. FIELD POST, JAPAN

	1963		1962		1961		1960		1959		1958	
	American	Local	American	Local	American	Local	American	Local	American	Local	American	Local
State Department:												
1. Complement positions:												
Fukuoka	6	15	6	15	6	18	6	18	6	18	6	18
Kobe-Osaka	17	31	18	31	22	31	22	29	22	29	23	29
Nagoya	7	11	7	11	7	12	7	12	7	12	7	12
Sapporo	3	6	3	6	3	6	3	6	3	6	3	6
Yokohama	5	8	8	17	10	17	12	17	12	17	11	16
Consular unit, Okinawa	6	9	6	9	8	8	8	8	9	8	9	7
Subtotal	44	80	48	89	56	92	58	90	59	90	59	88
2. Noncomplement positions:												
Refugee relief program:												
Kobe												
Yokohama												
Nagoya												
Fukuoka												
Subtotal												
U.S. Information Service	11	134	9	138	11	142	11	151	14	151	14	153
Affiliated agencies:												
FBIS, Hokkaido	4	6	4	6	4	5	4	5	4	5	3	5
Bureau of Reclamation, Kobe	1	0										
MAAG/Japan	0	1	1	1	7	2	6	2	7	3	11	16
Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission:												
Hiroshima	33	596	34	615	34	620	35	614	38	613	42	558
Nagasaki	4	293	9	322	5	327	13	339	9	280	5	267
Subtotal, Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission	37	889	43	937	39	947	48	953	47	893	47	825
Grand total, all agencies (field)	97	1,110	105	1,171	117	1,188	127	1,201	131	1,142	134	1,087

	1957		1956		1955		1954		1953		1952	
	American	Local	American	Local	American	Local	American	Local	American	Local	American	Local
State Department:												
1. Complement positions:												
Fukuoka	6	18	6	15	5	13	5	16	6	21	6	18
Kobe-Osaka	21	28	19	27	19	36	19	35	21	47	20	43
Nagoya	8	12	6	10	6	13	6	12	5	16	6	17
Sapporo	3	6	3	6	3	9	3	9	3	10	3	12
Yokohama	11	16	11	15	13	14	13	12	14	23	13	26
Consular unit, Okinawa	9	7	8	6	7	4	5	4	3	2	----	----
Subtotal	58	87	53	79	53	89	51	88	52	119	48	116
2. Noncomplement positions:												
Refugee relief program:												
Kobe	----	----	1	3	0	2	----	----	----	----	----	----
Yokohama	----	----	0	1	0	0	----	----	----	----	----	----
Nagoya	----	----	0	2	0	1	----	----	----	----	----	----
Fukuoka	----	----	5	9	0	2	----	----	----	----	----	----
Subtotal	----	----	6	15	0	5	----	----	----	----	----	----
U.S. Information Service	19	162	20	177	19	149	14	147	25	197	14	209
Affiliated agencies:												
FBIS, Hokkaido	3	14	3	12	3	12	----	----	----	----	----	----
Bureau of Reclamation, Kobe	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----
MAAG/Japan	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----
Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission:												
Hiroshima	40	555	38	555	48	541	----	----	----	----	----	----
Nagasaki	4	256	3	250	3	188	----	----	----	----	----	----
Subtotal, Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission	44	811	41	805	51	729	----	----	----	----	----	----
Grand total, all agencies (field)	124	1,074	123	1,088	126	984	65	235	77	316	62	325

[1] Includes 2 United States-Japan Property Commission positions.

[2] Strength as of Sept. 30, 1955.

ADMINISTRATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 18, 1963

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
STAFFING AND OPERATIONS,
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

[This hearing was held in executive session and subsequently ordered made public by the chairman of the committee.]

The subcommittee met at 9 a.m., pursuant to notice, in room 3112, New Senate Office Building, Senator Henry M. Jackson (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senators Jackson, Pell, and Miller.

Staff members present: Dorothy Fosdick, staff director; Richard S. Page, research assistant; Judith J. Spahr, chief clerk; and Laurel A. Engberg, minority consultant.

OPENING STATEMENT OF THE CHAIRMAN

Senator JACKSON. The committee will come to order.

The subcommittee continues today its hearings on the role of our ambassadors and the missions they head in countries abroad. This subject constitutes one part of the subcommittee's nonpartisan study into questions of national security administration.

Recent events, particularly in South Vietnam, have underlined the growing complexity of coordination of U.S. policies at home and in the field, as the instruments of national policy have multiplied.

Our witness today has had a long and quite extraordinary experience in the development of U.S. foreign policy both in Washington and abroad. We are indeed fortunate to have with us the Honorable David K. E. Bruce, Ambassador of the United States to Great Britain.

His record of public service goes back more than three decades when he became vice consul in the U.S. Foreign Service in Rome. Ambassador Bruce has served in the U.S. Army in World War I and World War II performing notable work with the Office of Strategic Services from 1941 to 1945. He has been awarded military decorations by the United States and by six other countries.

His national service has included not only distinguished work abroad, but important duty at the top level of the State Department. He was Chief of the Economic Cooperation Administration to France, 1948–49; Ambassador to France, 1949–52; Under Secretary of State, 1952–53; American representative to the European High Authority for Coal and Steel, 1953–54; and Ambassador to the Federal Republic

of Germany, 1957–59. He was appointed Ambassador to Great Britain in 1961.

In addition to his outstanding public service he was in private business for more than 12 years in banking and in commercial activities.

It is a real honor to have Ambassador Bruce with us this morning.

Mr. Ambassador, I know you have a prepared statement and if there is no objection we shall include it in the record at this point.

STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID K. E. BRUCE, AMBASSADOR TO GREAT BRITAIN

Ambassador BRUCE. A wide range of U.S. Government agencies have representatives in Great Britain. The State Department has its own units—the Embassy in London and eight consulates in other cities. Attached to and forming integral parts of the Embassy, but at the same time responsible to their own departments, are representatives of the U.S. Information Service, the Agency for International Development, the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Commerce (including the Maritime Administration and the U.S. Travel Service), the Atomic Energy Commission, the Department of Justice, the Treasury Department (and Coast Guard), the National Institutes of Health, the Public Health Service, the Federal Aviation Agency, the Central Intelligence Agency, the three military services, and other branches or commands under the Department of Defense. Many of these have subunits which carry out activities apart from and not directly related to the work of the Embassy, though the Embassy renders them administrative support.

In addition to the above, there are a score or more other units, variously located and carrying out activities, under their separate instructions from other headquarters, which may have little to do with the Embassy. Many of them are military. Their activities cover a disparate range of matters, such as standardization of military equipment, allocation of radio frequencies, or exchange of scientific research information. Some of their work is regional, i.e., outside as well as within Great Britain.

Finally, there are the military commands: CINCNELM/CINCNAVEUR, Third Air Force, and Seventh Air Division. Their headquarters are in or near London. The Navy has several base and communications facilities and the Air Force has some twenty operating base and supporting facilities; these are located throughout the country.

This is a variegated official U.S. oversea representation. It employs a large number of people. At the present time, these total, roughly, as follows:

	American	British
All except military units outside the London area	3,900	1,900
Military units outside London	28,200	4,700
Total	32,100	6,600

Dependents of these employees total about twice the same numbers again.

The activities of most of these representatives are in some degree related to U.S. national security. The military commands and their subordinate units of course have their defined responsibilities and authority under their own higher headquarters. For the remainder, the primacy of the Ambassador and his responsibility to coordinate, supervise, and support all U.S. Government activities in Great Britain are recognized. This recognition exists on the part of both the U.S. representatives and the British or other people with whom they deal. I believe it can be fairly said that, so far as the conduct of a satisfactory overall relationship with the British Government and nation is concerned, this multifarious U.S. Government representation has not been detrimental.

It could not be correctly said, however, that all U.S. representatives here form a close-knit country team, functioning under the close direction of the Ambassador. I would limit the definition of the country team to units, indicated in the first paragraph above, which are substantively integrated in to the Embassy. This includes the Military Assistance Advisory Group and certain special security detachments. Effectively, this team comprises my whole staff and carries out the Embassy's work under the direction of myself and my assistants. Supervision and coordination of the total effort is accomplished by continuous contact of the members concerned with the work and by participation in general staff meetings, rather than by formal organization of a smaller "country team." Ad hoc working groups may be set up as required for specific projects.

At the same time, of course, the members of the team who are assigned by and receive direct instructions from agencies other than the State Department have their responsibilities and loyalties to those agencies. They are dependent upon those agencies for support, not the least of which is budgetary. Obviously, this fact imposes some limitations on the Ambassador's freedom to direct their activities and creates possibilities for working at cross purposes. Obvious cases in point are the MAAG, which is established by and receives orders from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with the line of command running through commander in chief, Europe; or the Army, Navy, and Air Force attachés, with, in Great Britain, their large staffs and manifold activities under Service orders.

I believe, nevertheless, that this team has functioned effectively and, from my point of view, satisfactorily. It has assisted me in the discharge of my responsibilities, and I have not considered myself hampered by conflicts or any lack of authority. I would not suggest that any more closely integrated organization be attempted at the mission, unless it were to follow from closer integration of decision making and instruction issuing in Washington. That, of course, is a different and undoubtedly difficult problem, outside the scope of this statement. In existing circumstances the Embassy in London seems to me to be reasonably well equipped and organized to enable the Ambassador to direct the overall conduct of the U.S. Government's business in Great Britain, in accordance with his instructions.

I can only speak well, also, of the way in which the military commands have endeavored to coordinate their actions with those of the

Embassy, in the interest of overall relations between the United States and Great Britain. Cases in point are various base-rights negotiation and management, handling of base closures, or conduct of good-community-relations programs. Again, when there have been possibilities of actions which might adversely affect overall relations, these have been created primarily by lack of coordination of instructions issued by higher headquarters.

Whether all of the work of all of the U.S. Government agencies in Great Britain is profitable would be for others to judge.

I think it might be interesting to list the categories of official U.S. representatives in the United Kingdom, with especial attention to those receiving administrative support from the Embassy.

The Embassy is composed as follows:

	American	Local
State:		
Program:		
London (executive, political, economic, and consular sections)	71	75
Consulates in United Kingdom	22	64
Shared administration, London (31 of 48 Americans are in communications unit)	48	156
Central complement trainees	7	
Marine guards	12	
USIS	16	54
AID	3	1
Agriculture	5	9
AEC	4	
Commerce:		
Trade Center	1	6
Travel Service	5	5
Maritime Administration	1	2
Defense:		
Service attachés	71	21
MAAG	15	2
Army special security detachment	5	
SUSLO	6	1
Miscellaneous DOD units to whom Embassy renders administrative support	170	103
Joint research and reports	68	9
FBIS	3	1
FAA	5	1
Justice	6	
NIH	2	
USPHS	1	6
Treasury:		
Customs	2	2
Financial attaché	5	
Internal Revenue Service	3	
Coast Guard	3	1
Total	560	519

In London, but not part of the Embassy, are two U.S. military commands: CINCNELM/CINCUSNAVEUR, with 649 American and 278 British personnel, and Third Air Force Headquarters, with 2,419 American and 1,069 local personnel. Additionally, there are some 300 American and 30 local personnel assigned to Department of Defense units in the London area which are not part of the aforementioned Navy and Air Force headquarters and are not administratively connected with the Embassy.

In the United Kingdom outside London the Air Force has some 27,500 American and 4,400 local personnel; the Army some 50 American personnel; the Navy some 700 American and 225 local personnel; and a U.S. civilian agency about 50 American and 50 local employees.

All in all, therefore, the U.S. Government has in the United Kingdom more than 32,000 American and 6,500 local personnel, most of whom work for the Department of Defense. All figures exclude dependents.

Senator JACKSON. Thank you for your statement, Mr. Ambassador. Possibly you may have some additional comments that you would like to make in connection with our study, before we start the questions.

Ambassador BRUCE. Thank you, Senator. I have read most of the transcripts of hearings which you have conducted in this study. I think in the case of the United Kingdom that we are rather free of any problem of a country team nature. Coordination there for one

reason or another is quite easy to achieve because we have no functioning AID program and no MAAG. The number of MAAG officers is to be drastically reduced next year. I think my principal problem, looking at it from the standpoint of an ambassador, is not to achieve coordination—that has worked out well—but to study and possibly to suggest how personnel of the different agencies of the American Government, which are represented in London might be, if I may say so, reduced somewhat in number.

We have in the Embassy building between 750 and 800 people. Of those, about 23 percent are State Department personnel in the sense that they are directly on the State Department rolls.

Numbered amongst them, for example, as my statement shows, are the communications personnel, in the administrative section, which is the largest of all of our sections in the Embassy.

In the section called Shared Administration, which means the support on a reimbursable basis given by State to the other agencies in the London Embassy, there are 48 Americans and 156 local employees. Thirty-one of these 48 Americans are in the Communications Unit.

I am not in a position to form a judgment in respect to overstaffing, except as regards State Department personnel. The various departments and agencies in Washington which have representation in London have to determine what their necessities are.

I would make the general observation from my experience in the Department of Commerce and later in the Department of State in Washington that the requirements which are placed on the field by way of questionnaires sent to the field are usually in excess of any real or legitimate demand of end users.

It is very easy to write a list of what you want reports on, and send it to everybody in the field. Then the flow of reports starts in. I think it is common to all Government departments to make those lists rather more inclusive than is necessary, and this in turn breeds the necessity for having a large number of personnel abroad.

As I say, I don't think anybody representing one agency is in a position to pass on the necessities of another, but I have the general impression that all through government, in the legislative branch as well as the executive branch, there is a good deal of demand for information to satisfy very often the particular curiosity of individuals in rather specialized fields.

How far all that is necessary, as I say, is difficult to determine.

I know in those few cases where I have tried to make a personal investigation of personnel, and I am not now speaking of the United Kingdom, you run into the difficulty of finding it quite easy to justify the necessity of having everybody who works for you. To achieve a balanced judgment as to what is essential and what is nonessential in the way of personnel is as difficult a task as I know of.

I am inclined to believe, however, that the judgment cannot be made effectively by the sponsoring agency. For example, when you send out your own inspector general, it is not a question of bias, but the fairest man in the world, I think, is going to be more lenient about the number of people whom he thinks his department must have stationed abroad or at home, than would be an impartial person or possibly a committee reporting to a department other than his own. I have no suggestions to make as to how this should be done. It is

not a good thing to have people scurrying around and interfering with the operations of any agency, whether domestic or foreign. But I think that much of the growth which has taken place, certainly in our agencies abroad, has been inspired by the demands of the moment. After the necessity—if there has been one—has passed, the tendency is for the personnel to remain.

I want to say another thing with special reference to the State Department. The problem of interagency agreement is to my mind the most difficult of all to resolve. Obviously, when you come to the conduct of foreign affairs, where at least in theory the State Department has preeminence, it is perfectly unreal to say that State has a monopoly on the conduct of foreign affairs, because so many other departments of government have a direct interest in it.

But the assertion of the leadership of State, I think, is of great importance, and I take it, it is recognized by the other departments of government. But when you come to implement it you get into what I call the interagency problem.

One finds almost invariably that interagency committees are dominated by one, two, or possibly three people. But then you have this horde of others who come along to be present in case there is an emergency, or to answer questions that their superiors cannot answer, and they sit in serried ranks all around the room. If you want to see anybody in Defense or State, or any other department I know of, they seem to be perpetually off in committee meetings.

I know, from the standpoint of service abroad, that there is a tendency in any embassy to have meetings with great frequency and at regular times, rather than what I would call ad hoc meetings for a specific need.

Speaking of the State Department at home or abroad, the real problem, I think, is the proper use of personnel rather than its proliferation. I believe this also applies to other departments of government.

I have the notion that something might be done. I know a great many people have addressed themselves to this problem—trying to cut down the number of interagency committees and also the number of people on each such committee. This is not something which the legislative branch would want to become directly involved in. But I think it is one of the prime factors accounting for such overstaffing as exists whether at home or abroad.

Senator, I will be happy to respond to any questions which occur to you.

Senator JACKSON. Very good. Following up on your comments on overstaffing, you have served as Ambassador in the three major countries—France, Germany, and Great Britain—would you say that the fact that an ambassador does not have control over the budget of the individual agencies to be coordinated, and does not have control over promotions, makes it difficult for an ambassador to deal, for example, with the problem of overstaffing?

Ambassador BRUCE. I have not encountered that myself for the simple reason that in London we do not have a large number of people exercising power and influence coming from another agency. If you look at the figures on Defense representation, of course, they are very large—the units that are out in the country as well as those that are

stationed in London. But the majority of those people are engaged in operational work.

I can imagine in countries where you have a large AID mission and where the amounts of money expended by it are far greater than by any other U.S. governmental source, that unless the ambassador asserts his authority he is going to lose control of the situation.

I saw it happen in the Marshall plan. There is no question whatever that in the early days of the Marshall plan those that headed the Marshall plan missions which were under the aegis of an embassy—and the head of the mission was second in rank to the ambassador himself—had in most instances more authority than the ambassador. But that was a transient affair which was quite natural. The fact that somebody had the authority to report to Washington that he was recommending the expenditure of a huge sum in American dollars, in a certain way, in that country meant the officials of that country were going to look to him rather than to the ambassador.

In my own experience, in recent years, those questions have not come up. As I say, in London, there is no AID program, there is no MAAG program, except a liquidating one, and I have had no difficulty whatever with any element in my embassy. Nor do I anticipate any, and the fact that they have separate budgets, in fact separate communications, doesn't make any difference. They are extremely good in keeping me informed of anything of a policy nature. As regards their individual operations these are really not of interest to the State Department, nor is there any reason why an ambassador should be apprised of the details of them, because they are operational in a fairly narrow sense.

Senator JACKSON. Let us look for a moment at the relationship between Defense and State and the problems of coordination of defense and foreign policy. Based on your long experience, do you feel that most of this coordination should be done here in Washington or should it be a combination of coordination at the top in Washington and in the field?

Ambassador BRUCE. I do not think, Senator, there is any difficulty or any need for extension of the authority of the ambassador in that respect in the field. The problem is really a Washington one. It is a matter of coordination between departments and agencies here at home, where power resides.

An ambassador who does not control his own embassy and all elements in it ought to be fired, because you are dealing with people of good will and, except in extraordinary circumstances, I cannot imagine a dispute arising where even if there were a difference in principle it could not readily be resolved within the embassy.

There might be an extraordinary case where each party to the dispute should be allowed to report back to Washington and where you needed a reconciliation or a compromise at the highest level. But the chief trouble is in Washington itself, and it is an extraordinarily difficult thing to handle, I would imagine, because the Defense Department from its standpoint has a legitimate interest in a great many things which are tinged, however, with political implications.

I will give you an example.

Suppose one decides to liquidate bases in a foreign country. That is a matter which requires primarily a military judgment. But it is

necessary, and certainly advisable, that the representatives of the United States in that country inform the local authorities as long as possible in advance of the intention to do so because you get into questions of displacement of local employees and whole communities are affected. I think the style of how it is done—the manner in which it is done—can be as important as the substance. Nobody is going to say to the U.S. Government, "You have got to keep so many locals employed because it is important to our community." But the way in which you present the fact that they are going to cease to be employed has great importance to everyone, whether they are representing that community politically, or whether they are in the grocery business or something else. Time must be given to everyone to readjust themselves.

Senator JACKSON. That has some earmarks of what Congressmen and Senators run into within the United States?

Ambassador BRUCE. Yes.

Senator JACKSON. In connection with bases and facilities.

Ambassador BRUCE. That is right.

Senator JACKSON. You have given this as a good example of the need to have an ambassador adequately informed in advance of a problem so that it can be dealt with properly and without embarrassment with the government concerned?

Ambassador BRUCE. Yes.

Senator JACKSON. Your point is that how you handle a matter like this is of great importance. It can be done the right way or the wrong way. It is not helpful when a foreign government first learns about a matter like this from the radio or the newspaper.

Ambassador BRUCE. In my own case, I may say that I have been advised on matters like this by Defense considerably in advance, and given plenty of time in which to advise the British Government that certain dispositions are going to be made in regard to military installations in the United Kingdom. But I know from some of my colleagues that this has been a vexatious problem in other places.

There again, I speak of it because the coordination in that respect must be done in Washington. For example, the Department of Defense may decide to close a base. Defense should work with State on this, and sufficient time should be given so that the people on the ground, and by that I mean the host government as well as the U.S. representatives there, are fully aware that this is going to entail complications, and that they better make the best possible explanation in regard to it.

Senator JACKSON. I was interested in your comments about the communications problem and the number of inquiries to be answered by an embassy.

We have had a number of witnesses in our study who have emphasized the flood of paper, the volume of telegrams, and the quantity of reports that are exchanged between the embassies and Washington. This situation occurs even in countries with which we have no really basic problems.

I wonder if you would care to comment further on this and give us any suggestions for corrective measures.

Ambassador BRUCE. I am of the opinion that a large number of communications from a field post to headquarters in Washington

should be handled either by letter or by airgram, and that telegrams should be reserved for really urgent cases.

Urgent cases will come up in tremendous numbers in any event. For example, there has been a great increase this year in the number of immigrant and nonimmigrant visas issued by our consuls in Great Britain. Many of them require telegraphic communications. But that is not the sort of communication which clutters up the wires. It is the long piece, it is the repetition of what has appeared in newspapers that I think should be more carefully scrutinized.

We get strict admonitions from Washington to cut down on telegraphic traffic. In a sense we have been successful, but I think there should be a greater resort to slower methods of communication—letters which today are delivered for the most part by air post, and airgrams.

But the real problem is the number of inquiries which are addressed to the field at random, and often on a wholesale basis.

As I indicated previously, the end user of these inquiries is often an official in our Government who is intensely interested in a particular phase of activity in the foreign country. His desire for information is in his own mind urgent, and he will sit down and send off a telegram saying the Department of State requires, on an immediate basis, a report on such-and-such a matter.

When I first arrived as a vice consul in Rome many years ago, I remember getting the job of handling a request from the Department of Commerce to make a comprehensive survey of the market for corsets in Italy.

The market for corsets in those days was practically nonexistent. They had contraptions of their own which seemed to meet everyone's needs. But that particular request was addressed to every American diplomatic and consular post around the world.

How many men like myself sat down and wrote silly reports on the demand for American corsets, I dread to think.

One little bit of carelessness like saying: "We want a report," and hundreds of man-hours are consumed in the process of responding.

Suppose an official says, we want a report on all railroad traffic moving east of a given line. It is hard to imagine how many reports are going to come in as a result of that request and how repetitive they are going to be.

So much of State Department interchange is raw material, which requires evaluation, and this means staff in Washington to evaluate it.

How you determine what needs to be reported and what does not need to be reported is a task which has to be handled, I think, within a department itself.

With the growth of traffic between countries and increasing population, I see no way to control the flood of paper except from the standpoint of requirements. The essential has to be separated from the nonessential; for example, reports should not be asked for on things which substantively have little importance. In other words, requirements ought to be screened down as far as it is possible to screen them. Those matters which are urgent should be the subject of urgent communications, and those things which are relatively unimportant should be transmitted as far as possible by mail or by airgrams.

The State Department has made a determined effort, I know in my own case, to reduce the amount of telegraphic traffic and we have made some progress in that direction. But the number of inquiries that come in increases all the time, and I dare say will continue to do so.

The rise in travel abroad of our own compatriots is partly responsible for this.

Speaking only of the State Department now, if there is any virtue in the reporting which is done from the Embassy in London, it resides in those program divisions within the Embassy which are concerned with political and economic and consular functions.

In London we have 71 Americans and 75 locals in the executive, political, economic, and consular sections. Prior to the last war I think that I could have run the Embassy with those individuals, with proper administrative support. And the administrative support would have been far smaller than it now is, because the Embassy did not then include, as it now does, something like 40 units of other Government agencies.

I could not say that the National Institutes of Health, Federal Aviation Agency, Atomic Energy Commission, or Department of Justice should not have representatives in London, because I think most of them should. But I am absolutely unable to pass on the question of how many representatives they should have. I would not be able to make the study necessary to determine this, because the requirements placed on them by their superiors in Washington determine the workload.

As regards our own State Department program there, in my opinion the number engaged on it is not sufficient, and this is not a popular thing for me to say around the Department because they are always trying to subtract one officer or another to send him to Africa or somewhere or another where they don't have enough money.

We had to add two consular officers because of the tremendous rise in the visa, welfare, and other work that comes up in the consular section. And suppose, say, I have nine political officers, practically always one is on leave, one is ill, or one has been assigned somewhere else on temporary duty. Temporary duty has a nasty habit of stretching itself out. I had one man who was away from London for 5 months because he was one of the best experts in the Department on Middle Eastern affairs, and he had to concern himself with affairs in that area. We frequently send somebody down from the economic section to spend months in Geneva. I approve of that because I think the use of experts is important. From the standpoint of an embassy, however, the subtraction of a single political officer from those on the rolls does strip you down to a lower figure than is desirable. The same applies to the economic section. If an embassy had no concern with other U.S. Government agencies, it could be run with no more State Department American personnel proportionately than we have at the Embassy in London.

When I gave the figures for the program staff in London I was including the clerical employees. As regards officers, they constitute less than 10 percent of the people who are using the Embassy building.

Senator MILLER. May I ask a question on that point?

Senator JACKSON. Senator Miller?

Senator MILLER. When you say "an American embassy," do you mean an American embassy in Great Britain or any embassy?

Ambassador BRUCE. An American embassy in Great Britain, because I take that as an example that would not be apposite in troubled areas like Vietnam, or the Congo. In Great Britain the relationship between governments is amicable and it is comparatively easy to transact business. You do not have the problem of interpreters and dealing with difficult foreign languages.

Senator MILLER. Would you also say in the cases of much smaller countries where our interests are much less widespread that there would be a corresponding lower requirement for personnel? I expect you would not want us to infer that what you had to say would mean that in any American embassy in practically any country throughout the world the number of 71 would be a sort of target?

Ambassador BRUCE. Oh, no. I was using that only as an example. Because you may have in London 12 political officers, it does not follow that one should not have more than that, say, in Germany, Paris, or Italy. It would depend on the situation in the country.

Senator MILLER. Or less than that?

Ambassador BRUCE. For example, you would not need as many overall, especially on administration, if you did not have all of the other agencies in Britain at the present time.

Senator MILLER. I am not saying that it would have much effect, but are you not affected by the number of U.S. Government people in Britain representing the various agencies? There are things that come up constantly which involve the Embassy.

Ambassador BRUCE. Yes; but I don't think that would affect what I call the number of program officers. It would affect administration, of course, sharply. It has a large influence on the communications branch of administration.

Senator MILLER. Well, what I had in mind is that the growth of agencies within the country team operation has been substantial since World War II and this involves more and more of the ambassador's time and does involve some people, I would think, as compared with the situation prior to World War II.

Ambassador BRUCE. Yes; it does. It does necessitate a great deal of added work on the part of the staff and applies especially to the ambassador's own office.

Senator JACKSON. When we have a good ambassador and a good embassy staff, it has been my personal view that they could be a very vital part of our policy planning. When an ambassador is in a country as important as Great Britain, he has an opportunity to translate his day-to-day experience into what the direction should be for the future.

I think we can agree that the operator can be the best planner. I wonder if this is not something we should capitalize on, and possibly you would have some comments.

Ambassador BRUCE. Well, in the last analysis, any important policy which represents the overall interests of the American Government—in this case, the executive branch—is going to be decided ultimately at home.

The role of an ambassador, if he is competent, and if it is to be a useful one, would consist in advising those who finally are going to

form the policy as to his views on the subject derived from experience in the country to which the policy is going to be applied.

There are lots of fellows that I have seen who, whether they are flushed with the enthusiasm of youth or the arrogance of age or whatever it may be, go to a foreign post—particularly for the first time—and think that they are policymakers. This is especially true if they are not familiar with the intricacies of bureaucratic government.

The most useful thing that an ambassador can do—certainly in the beginning—is to carry out faithfully and loyally his instructions and not to go freewheeling all over the place, and to confine his observations on what he thinks is wrong about policies which are about to be implemented or in the course of being carried out, to his own department.

The clutter of speeches which are made by all sorts of representatives of different agencies of our Government, whether at home or abroad, is sometimes extremely disruptive.

To get back to what you originally asked me, I think the role of an ambassador, if he understands conditions in a foreign country, is to advise his own department and not to display a desire to make policy in the field, because considerations enter into the policy that he would not know anything about.

Senator JACKSON. When a country policy paper is worked out, this is done by the State Department working with the ambassador to the country concerned?

Ambassador BRUCE. Oh, yes.

Senator JACKSON. Drawing on your rich experience over the years in the Foreign Service, do you find that this relationship has improved and that the ambassador is playing a more important part in the formulation of the country paper?

Ambassador BRUCE. Yes; I think the issuance of the Presidential order which gives the ambassador authority over the other agencies of the Government, making him responsible for them, has brought that under control and has been extremely helpful.

Senator JACKSON. You are referring to President Kennedy's letter of 1961?

Ambassador BRUCE. Yes; and a previous Executive Order from President Eisenhower.

Senator JACKSON. Your point is that once the country policy paper is worked out the ambassador can play a very important role in monitoring its implementation, and in offering critical comment to the department when such is in order——

Ambassador BRUCE. That is correct, sir.

Senator JACKSON. ——to give continuing advice to the Department, based on his day-to-day operating experience in the field?

Ambassador BRUCE. That is right, Senator.

Senator JACKSON. Senator Miller?

Senator MILLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Ambassador, I want to tell you how much I appreciate the opportunity to hear these very knowledgeable words from you. I particularly like your statement that management is a much better approach to some of these problems than proliferation of personnel.

I appreciate your approach with respect to management being directed at the embassy level, but I am just wondering if you do not

have some ideas about the management side with respect to the headquarters itself here in Washington?

It seems to me that I detected from what you had to say about telegrams and requests for information that perhaps the management problem is not all at the embassy level, but might be equally or even greater at the headquarters level here in Washington.

Is that so?

Ambassador BRUCE. I think it is true. The requirements are stated in Washington.

The primary duty of an embassy and the diplomatic officers in the old days was to negotiate and also to report. The reporting still is an essential function, although I must say that particularly in some of the larger capitals where some of our own newspapers have allowed their correspondents to remain for years, they are better informed on general conditions in the country than any embassy officer could be who is there on a temporary basis.

I think one of the great handicaps in reporting is the fact that in the majority of instances our people probably do not stay long enough.

For example, in three capitals I have known three representatives of the New York Times, each of whom has served in that capital for 10 years or longer. They had access to everyone.

Embassy representatives have the asset of sources of information, some of which are not available to newspaper correspondents, and therefore reporting from an embassy standpoint is essential.

However, I would regard it as secondary to the negotiations which are almost endless. Take, for example, some affair involving civil aviation. The discussions never seem to terminate. Year after year you are engaged in negotiations. There is no substitute for them.

From the standpoint of substantive State Department work, I think I have an embassy in London that is understaffed. I am talking about program work. It is only by the expenditure of unceasing effort and energy that one keeps abreast of a lot of this work. This is now true particularly in our consular section. I think it applies to our economic and political sections. I believe, without complaining about it, it applies to me personally and to people in my immediate entourage. I feel we could do better work had we a few more people in certain categories.

But the demands made by your headquarters determine the amount of work which you have to do. If the demands are fairly overwhelming you will not get the sort of voluntary reports, those which spring almost from the personal predilection or desire of somebody to investigate something which may be of importance to policy. They just do not get around to it.

It is like your own duties here. You are so preoccupied with matters which are urgent and pressing that how you ever have time to go off and, for example, prepare speeches is a mystery to everybody, including yourselves. We have that all through government, and the answer to it is not to keep building up staffs. The answer is to reduce the requirements, and as I say, I think that can only be done in Washington.

Senator MILLER. In connection with requirements that come from some other agency, like the Commerce Department to which you alluded, do those come directly from the agency to the embassy? Or

is there a requirement for coordination with the State Department to enable the State Department, for example, to determine whether or not they might have the information on board right here in our own headquarters in Washington—which I understand has happened on occasion—or at least to enable someone in the State Department headquarters to determine the priority which should be given this job out in the field?

Ambassador BRUCE. Well, in the case of Commerce, that is fairly simple, because as a result of an arrangement made years ago the Commerce Department's requirements are channeled through the State Department and two officers in the economic section of the Embassy who are actually on State Department rolls.

That does not mean that those men, as in the case of Agriculture, do not have their own operational contacts and communications with their departments in Washington. This presents no difficulty because, as I say, the communications are operational. I have never had in any post the slightest difficulty with representatives of Commerce or Agriculture or even Defense, in regard to any question of policy because that all flows through the State Department and to the ambassador.

But the reconciliation needed between different points of view at home, for example, in the relationship between Defense and State, is something over which an embassy has absolutely no control, and is often completely unaware of. I do not get conflicting instructions from one or more government departments. I don't know what goes on behind the scenes here at home in Washington. But I do know from experience the enormous difficulty of getting an established policy position which you can then represent as such to a foreign government.

Senator MILLER. One more question.

With respect to your suggestion that either some individual or perhaps a committee approach be used to try to cope with this problem of proliferation, I am wondering if you had in mind something in the nature of an inspection team out of Washington, not staffed entirely by the State Department, possibly containing membership from some of the principal agencies or from the Bureau of the Budget, or just what you had in mind.

I can see where you are venturing into an area which could encompass not only the problem of proliferation out in the field but also the problem of coordination and policy determination which you just referred to in answer to my last question.

I don't believe we have any centralized superagency, as such, unless you go to the White House. We have the Bureau of the Budget which sometimes is turned to as a sort of a supercoordinating agency, but I am not too sure that the Bureau of the Budget would want to take on such a task, although they might welcome membership on the inspection group.

Do we have need for something like this, perhaps a permanent ad hoc committee on embassy staffing, a team of experts, or two or three teams of experts who go out to the various embassies once a year, or maybe once every other year, to give an analysis, let us say a management analysis of the staff and the requirements?

Ambassador BRUCE. I would hope, Senator, that there would not be any new committee or team or anything else established in this re-

spect. The personnel of the State Department stationed in London, at least, and I imagine this applies to other missions abroad, is under scrutiny at the present time and has been so for many years. As I say, some reductions have been made, and in my opinion have gone too far. This is only a personal opinion. The Defense Department, I understand, has all the data on hand and is giving urgent consideration to the number of Defense personnel who are in the United Kingdom. Representation of other agencies, like the AEC and the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare would have to be reviewed in the first instance by their own departments. This has to be done in Washington.

As time goes on, if there is a further proliferation of agencies, I think they have got to be scrutinized one by one. Now, as I understand it, in the case of an agency not already represented, let us say in the Embassy in London, application must be made to the State Department if they wish to send one or more of such people to be stationed permanently there.

This brings up the question whether or not the objectives desired by a particular agency cannot be obtained by temporary rather than permanent assignments. A permanent assignment almost always springs from a temporary one. People go off, let us say to London, with the expectation of being posted there for 6 months and then returning home; years later they will still be there.

When you get to the coordination of basic policy, the coordination of different points of view between departments of government who have either a direct or peripheral interest in foreign policy, this cannot be achieved in the field. It has to be done in Washington.

Senator MILLER. Now, whom would you suggest would be the proper person or agency or how would you suggest that this problem be handled?

Ambassador BRUCE. Coordination of policy?

Senator MILLER. Yes; coordination of policy, by more activity on the part of, say, the National Security Council, or just what would be the method that you would suggest to handle that problem?

Ambassador BRUCE. First, I think the leadership of the State Department in the direction of foreign policy—the Secretary of State acting, of course, as the agent of the President—must be recognized by every department of government. Whether there is any lack of such recognition at the present time I don't know. This has been a fruitful cause for contention at times in the past.

Secondly, no matter how coordination is arrived at, it is the Secretary of State who should finally speak for the Government to foreign governments, except where the President carries on personal communication with the chiefs of government.

This raises the question, for example, of the nature of the delegations that we send to conferences where negotiations are to be carried on with, let us say, foreign ministers of other countries.

Our delegations, I think, have almost invariably been larger in point of numbers than those of anyone else. You find the "brief carrying element" injected. In American delegation meetings you have the Secretary of State, for example, surrounded with representatives from several other agencies before he goes into a public or even private negotiation with foreign ministers from other countries. Time after

time I have heard somebody representing one of the agencies observe: "I am sorry, Mr. Secretary, but I hope you will not say anything like that until I get clearance from my headquarters in Washington."

That sort of thing takes place not only on the eve, but between sessions, of a conference where the Secretary of State simply cannot wait, unless he is going to look like a dolt, to get advice from another agency in Washington as to what he is able to say. I never have seen this occur in the case of any other government.

This is what I mean by coordination at home. There are certain areas in which the Secretary of State has got to take the final responsibility even if he hasn't obtained clearance from everybody else concerned.

I am appalled and always have been by the volume of papers that goes into briefing books for high officials. I am sitting on a selection board at the moment, and as you read these fellows' records, the amount of talent in the Department of State is absolutely astonishing. For example, the ability to draft a sensible paper on an obtuse subject is to me a source of constant marvel. But no man would be capable of going to a conference and absorbing the contents of these excellent papers in a briefing book. They have got to be prepared because some question might come up and you would have to refer to them.

I am only saying that, in an important conference, the Secretary of State must be on his own. It must be recognized that he speaks for the American Government on foreign affairs as the agent of the President. Mistakes may be made in that regard, but this thing of checks and balances, I think, has been carried too far. It is bound to be carried too far if you start from the bottom and staff something all the way up through a series of committees, through layers of committees, until finally the decision has to be reached.

What we need in government are men and women able to make decisions, and ready to make decisions. Occasionally mistakes will be made, but we cannot have government by compromise, and that is my chief objection to what I call the committee system when carried to excess.

Senator MILLER. Thank you very much.

Senator JACKSON. Thank you, Senator Miller. That is a very fine comment, Mr. Ambassador. When there is committee layering and when argument between conflicting views gets out of reasonable bounds, it creates what Robert Lovett has so well termed the "foulup factor."

You mentioned that there is some rule in effect now that when a given department desires to send someone abroad on either temporary or permanent assignment that the Department of State must first clear it.

Is this being handled in a rather perfunctory way or is a serious review made within the Department of State as to the actual requirements for such people abroad?

Ambassador BRUCE. This situation has come up a great many times in my own experience. The agency that requests an assignment, whether temporary or permanent, first states to the State Department that it would like to have such representation. The State Department then asks the embassy affected its views on the subject. In most cases you have to have, I think, almost a prima facie proof, if there is such a thing, that such an assignment is a necessary one, that the functions

or the duties to be carried out by the officer whom it is proposed to send cannot be handled by existing staff, or handled on behalf of the agency by another agency, usually in such event the State Department. I have found no particular difficulty in that regard.

Where I do find difficulty is in the increase of existing staff representing other agencies. For example, if you have a growth of interest in the scientific field, you will find that one science adviser in the opinion of many people at home should be assisted by another, and then by another, and another. I am not at all sure myself that that area of our Government's interest is adequately covered. I have excellent scientific people in my own Embassy. I am not at all certain there should not be more. I have not made up my mind on this because we have not been asked to increase our scientific representation.

If I was asked on behalf of another established department of government as to whether or not they should add personnel to their staff at the London Embassy, I would in principle be reluctant to agree to it and they would have to prove the case. In my opinion, it should only be finally determined as a State Department matter.

Senator JACKSON. It seems to me we have to attack this problem right at the source, and that is primarily right here in this city where ideas are generated within all the agencies of government to send people abroad. For instance, almost every agency lays claim at present to some important field of science and it does not take long for some enterprising expert in any given agency to figure out a program to justify his going abroad to make a study. This problem can become a very difficult one unless it is handled right at the source, and that is here in Washington. Would you agree with that?

Ambassador BRUCE. It has to be handled at the source, Senator. Unless the personnel is to be attached to the Embassy staff, we would have no prior knowledge whatever of the activity of, say, a group of traveling experts.

Senator JACKSON. You have paid a very fine tribute to professionals in the Foreign Service and the importance of professionalism. If there is any merit to professionalism—and I believe there is—it is that the first-rate professional acquires through education, training, and above all experience, a competence in the foreign policy field—a capacity to exercise good judgment. I wonder if you have any further comments in this regard? I have in mind occasions when wise professional advice has been ignored, with, in my judgment, unfortunate consequences.

Do you have some suggestions as to how these people can be better utilized in the service?

Ambassador BRUCE. Well, I would like to make several reflections on this.

First of all, the question of personnel assignment is, as everyone knows, whether it be in a corporation or whether it be in a governmental agency, a most difficult one. I am not familiar enough with the personnel assignment system at present in the State Department to venture to do more than generalize about it.

I think one of the troubles in the past has been that inevitably a man who is a Foreign Service officer is a specialist, a specialist in a broad sense, but also usually a specialist in a particular sense.

When I first went into the Foreign Service in 1925 the best Chinese language officer, according to reports, that they had ever had, had

served in China for something like 15 years. I remember very distinctly his being transferred, so he could broaden his experience, and assigned either to Honduras or Guatemala. It seemed to me a whimsical decision.

That is an unusual case, but I think there is a tendency in personnel assignment to do what is called "broadening one's experience." And to "broaden one's experience" an assignment would be necessary in all of the principal areas of the world sometime during one's career.

Of course, there should be periodic returns to service in the State Department in Washington.

As I said before, I do believe that the duration of assignments in foreign countries is too short. You must have a familiarity acquired by a considerable period of residence in a foreign country if you are going to report accurately on what is occurring there.

In the case of the higher officers your ability to negotiate is enhanced tremendously by some degree of familiarity—acquired over a considerable period of time—with conditions prevailing in that country, a familiarity which becomes recognized by foreign officials.

I have noticed, in previous testimony before this committee, mention of the tremendous disparity between the length of service on the part of our ambassadors, contrasted with the tours of duty of foreign chiefs of mission in this Capital. I don't think the latter is attributable entirely to what somebody said, that residence here is very pleasant and offers attractive possibilities and the rest of it. I think it is dictated by the policy of these governments who believe that if they have a successful ambassador in Washington, he becomes more useful to his government because of his length of residence here.

I am going to make another point now. It is probably a shocking remark to make, but I believe that the State Department has always been under-financed. Now, when I say under-financed, I am not talking about the "salaries and expense" area. But when you think of the small amount, percentagewise, which it costs to run the entire State Department for a single year compared with the cost of a single airplane carrier, I think we have been niggardly. It may be the fault of presentation by the State Department for appropriations; I don't know, I have not read the testimony for many years. It may be because the State Department does not have any constituency to say its work is important, which is the reason often quoted.

The question of whether or not you are going to have political appointees as chiefs of missions, whether or not you are going to have an entirely professional staff all the way up to chief of mission, is something that can never be determined entirely in favor of the professionals under existing circumstances, for the simple reason that we do not have enough young people coming in at the bottom. And that is a matter of money.

When we talk about career development, we are going to have to enlarge the number that are selected on a preliminary basis from the applicants to the Foreign Service, and then weed them out when they are young.

I have noticed in Great Britain that when men come into their service, very often they will then go off for a year, whether to learn a language or whether to learn about a country to which later they will be assigned. They are almost on a probationary basis.

We ought to bring more people in at the bottom of our service. I think we have too few young entries.

I don't myself think you can fill every chief of mission post in the Foreign Service at the present time with professionals. There are just not enough to go around. This is contrary to the opinion of my friend for whom I have a great respect and admiration, Ellis Briggs.

The aim should be eventually to have a service like the British and like the French, where at least, theoretically, every position in every grade in every foreign mission could be filled by a professional. But the way to go about it is to increase the number of young people coming in and then, as I say, to weed them out. And that is an expensive process.

Senator JACKSON. Senator Pell?

Senator PELL. Mr. Ambassador, it is a great pleasure to be with you today.

One of the problems is keeping the able younger men in the Service. I notice that both you and I got out after about 5 or 6 years in the career service.

How do you think that the younger men can be kept in when one of the basic traditions within the Service runs counter to a point you made earlier, which was the importance of finding men who will take responsibility?

I wonder if you would agree with my thought that the way to get promoted through the lower grades of the Service is to avoid mistakes, which does not necessarily mean to take responsibility. How does one change this policy?

Ambassador BRUCE. I think it is difficult because it depends very much on the personality of the officer. On the other hand, the attractiveness of the Foreign Service, it seems to me, has progressively increased.

The scale of pay and allowances has improved over a period of years. Obviously nobody is going to save any money in it, but that applies to the whole of the civil service. And I would think the profession as a profession is one which will continue to be exceedingly attractive.

How you get young men and women to take on responsibility is a difficult question, but it applies almost to the same extent to people who come in and start in any walk of life, in any profession, in any business.

I do not think in the bureaucracy—I am talking now about the State Department—that the younger men shirk responsibility in order to make themselves safe any more than probably one does in any other occupation.

The difficulty, I think, is more whether this is a career which offers to one who is going to embrace it as a permanent profession, all that one could ask for in the way of fairness.

I suggest that the first correction to be made is to make it unnecessary for the occupant of any State Department post, no matter where, to have to draw on private means in order to occupy that post. I consider it quite disgraceful, to be frank, that in a post like London whoever is sent there must spend a large amount of private money in order to occupy that post. The amount in relation to the whole State Department budget is trifling, but to have it known that the American Government does not make it possible for a career officer,

unless he has outside resources, to be Ambassador to Great Britain, I think, is almost a national shame. I admit it is on a small scale, but it is a national shame, because it is wrong, it is unjust, and it is unfair also to the occupant.

I would say that by the proper allocation of money for maintenance allowances, entertainment, salary, et cetera, any post ought to be open to the ambition of a professional officer. Then when it comes to filling that post the question of the professional versus the nonprofessional appointment arises.

I think we have been fortunate in some places in the world in having chiefs of mission drawn from outside the career service. But there again I would say that unless they are ready to stay for more than a short period of time it would be better to have a professional occupy the post who had perhaps fewer gifts, maybe less personality, or a knowledge that was inferior to that of the political appointee.

These short appointments are bad, and that applies not only to our foreign missions. I think it applies to Government posts here in Washington—to the men who come in and go out quickly.

It is all right, of course, if they are brought in for special advice as consultants. That is an important and healthy development in our processes of government in the executive branch.

I do think we have got to do something about a longer term of office for people who become chiefs of missions.

Senator PELL. From a financial viewpoint do you think that the problem is more one of salary or of allowances? One of the thoughts that goes through my mind is the one that I believe has been wrestled with in connection with trying to get people to come into the Government from the middle ranks of business, men in their late thirties and forties with youngsters in school, hopefully in college. Do you think any sort of program could ever be worked out for scholarships for Government civil servants who have children?

Ambassador BRUCE. There is quite a program of that sort, as you know, privately financed; for example, the scholarship funds in the State Department.

Senator PELL. They are rather small.

Ambassador BRUCE. They are rather small. I established a small one myself. They do not begin to meet the need. A good deal could be done with regard to that.

I think salaries are adequate, but that allowances are often inadequate. You take consuls who are at posts where the American fleet comes in—like Hamburg, Bremen, or Nice. They will be busted as far as their private means are concerned, within a period of a couple of years, unless those means are extremely ample. It is not the ambassadors who are the worst off, it is the consuls and the consul generals in important posts.

You have, for example, an officer in a place like Paris, who finally had to leave there. He was made ambassador somewhere else. He said he could not possibly stay in Paris any longer because he was so heavily in debt it would take years to pay it off.

Comparatively, as I say, the amounts of money involved are trivial.

Senator PELL. I have always been interested in the fact that from the viewpoint of general foreign service work, representation and reporting and negotiation, the consuls are the generals of the Foreign

Service. I have also been struck by the fact that the fair-haired boys who get up more quickly usually come from the political sections of the various embassies.

I am trying to get figures now, and it is not proving as easy as it might, as to the relative rates of promotion, of those serving predominantly in the consular service as opposed to the other service.

Ambassador BRUCE. When I was a vice consul I felt rather unhappy about the other officers. Through the selection board process, in theory at least, there is no discrimination whatever. And everybody should have consular experience.

I think it would be absolutely wrong to assign a man initially to a political or economic section or to anything else. Let them all have consular duty; it is the best discipline in the world, and also it is a broadening experience.

In the selection board—and I have only sat on one which I am now doing—I have been amazed, pleasantly surprised and pleased, at the shifts that have been made between the two services. I was reviewing some papers yesterday where there were four different men who had been shifted from political sections to consulates, and vice versa. Two men had been shifted from being consul generals to appointment as chiefs of missions.

They have done the same thing in England under the so-called Eden reorganization.

The amalgamation of the two services will never be fully operative unless your personnel assignment process is good. As I said earlier, I don't know too much about its present operation. But promotions can be made, I think, in an efficient manner by the process of review by selection boards, where an independent judgment is arrived at about each person.

Judgments have to be based mostly on what is in the record, and that is not sufficient in itself. But I think highly of what is being done in this connection.

When it comes to personnel assignment there you have the next step and that involves, as I say, certain features to which I don't know how much attention is paid, such as the rounding out of experience, whether a man should have served in all the areas before he rises to the top. I am more and more inclined to believe that is not necessary. Certainly, if in his younger career he could have served on all continents it would be helpful. But if a fellow has a marked aptitude, and even an expertise of a regional nature, I think he should be left longer in such posts.

Senator PELL. One of the problems here reminds me of the Navy. In order to get a flag in the Navy you have to be promoted from commander to a seagoing capital vessel. That means that the seagoing duty of the commanding officer of that vessel is only 8 or 9 months, because there are not enough vessels to go around.

It seems to me we are faced with the same problem in embassies. I have often thought we perhaps start out on the wrong premise in the thought that the chief of mission is potentially resident in the briefcase of every Foreign Service officer. Because to my mind people go into the career as a way of life, they are interested in it, the same way one goes into the ministry—not to become a bishop but because of the pastoral work that is involved along the line. I am wondering

if they don't overemphasize the idea to all young Foreign Service officers: "You will not really be a success unless you become an ambassador, and this is your goal."

Ambassador BRUCE. Senator, I agree with you completely. It is like the old theory, you know, that inspired the Napoleonic slogan—that every private carried a marshal's baton in his knapsack.

I am not sure we don't overemphasize the ambition of becoming a chief of mission.

That somebody should feel that he hasn't really succeeded unless he becomes a chief of mission is pure mathematical nonsense. It is true we have over 100 ambassadors stationed at various places but that, after all, is absolutely nothing compared with the number of people who come and go in the Foreign Service.

I would have thought that one would feel adequately rewarded, and that one would have had an honorable career, if he retired at the age of 60 as a member of class 1. I think an artificial importance has been attached to what is called "promotion."

There are many officers, as a matter of fact, in class 1, who are doing far more important substantive work than chiefs of missions.

Senator PELL. Mr. Ambassador, the process of "Wristonization"—the amalgamation of the departmental and foreign services—has been pretty well achieved. The question here that bothers me is how do we unscramble that omelet and get the round pegs, previously in round holes, back in those round holes.

I wondered if you had any thoughts in that regard?

Ambassador BRUCE. I believe the answer is in personnel assignment and having the highest caliber of people devoting themselves with a degree of permanence to that task. It is not impossible for a group of people, even with the present large number of men and women employed in the State Department—provided the group would remain in personnel, and provided above all that they are competent—to get to know a great deal about these people and about their capabilities. I think that is the key, aside from promotion, to putting the right people in the right places.

Senator PELL. Of course, it is always such a feat to get really competent and imaginative people assigned to the office of personnel.

Ambassador BRUCE. I am not sure you don't have to bring people in from the outside as well.

Senator PELL. I had two further queries.

I have always been much enchanted with the idea of encouraging Foreign Service people to go on unpaid leaves of absence, preferably to go into a profession or business of some sort, become part of the general life of the community again, and then return to the Foreign Service.

I realize this can be done now under the law, but as we both well know, it shows bad school spirit if you ask for an unpaid leave of absence for a year or two.

Would it not be a good idea if either the Secretary of State or the President issued either an administrative or an Executive Order encouraging people in the Foreign Service to do this, and pointing out it is an attribute and would help them when it came to promotions rather than being a disadvantage?

Ambassador BRUCE. I have thought about that a little. It comes up, as you know, in connection with programs like the Rockefeller

fellowships. We have had some highly competent people who have been awarded fellowships who have gone off for a year and then returned to the Service. Assignment to the National War College is in the same category, where, from the standpoint of the State Department, they are not contributing anything to operations.

Senator PELL. I am not thinking so much of this kind of professional improvement, but of actually going into a job in a department store, in a bank, in a filling station—back in the general community.

Ambassador BRUCE. I have not given thought to this before, but I would wish myself that the period of what I would call apprenticeship were longer. I think it would be helpful if everyone in the Foreign Service started out by doing something else, and had some practical experience in business, and, if it were possible, in a profession—in both, or in one or the other.

For example, if it were not for the pressure of wanting to get in at an early age, it certainly would be a good thing if one who is going into the Foreign Service had practiced law for 5 years—I found it enormously useful myself.

After one is in the Service, 4 or 5 years off in a graduate school is too long because of competition. And I am not sure that a year off in midcareer is enough for a man to acquire any real knowledge. I am just not sure.

In the old days the idea of bringing people home with frequency, assigning them to the Department or giving them home leave, was animated by the desire to have them not lose contact with their own country—with the stream of thought in the country. But now with the ease of travel, also with the general increase in salaries, contact with your own country is an easy thing to preserve.

I find such a difference in men, say 20 years younger than I am and those 40 years younger, becoming Anglicized. You know, a few years ago I could have picked out anyone, I think, in any part of this country who had gone to Oxford or Cambridge—because of accent. Today I can't do it.

I have a notion, Senator, that to be from an early age in the same profession is not a good thing. I am not at all sure, however, that it would not be most important for those in midcareer, at least, to follow an academic course for a year.

In connection with that, I wish that encouragement could be given to officers who did independent writing and distinguished themselves in the field of thought or art, which you cannot well do in a single year. Possibly this encouragement could take the form of a small increase in salary, as is done in the British system to encourage learning foreign languages.

But I would like to see Foreign Service officers distinguish themselves academically, if possible.

Senator PELL. But to do this in the general community as opposed to specific government courses?

Ambassador BRUCE. Yes.

Senator PELL. Thank you very much, indeed.

Senator JACKSON. Mr. Engberg, possibly you have some questions.

Professor ENGBERG. Mr. Ambassador, you have been talking about policy and its relationship with Washington. How much prior information or notice did you have—holding it to your present assign-

ment, and some of these questions are also based, I think, upon your wide scope of knowledge over the past years—but specifically on things like the test ban and this fracas we had a year ago in regard to the Prime Minister of Canada. How much prior information would your office have on that type of thing and what type of preparations could you make then in setting up the British picture for this?

Ambassador BRUCE. I had knowledge of the test ban for a long period. It was a subject in which Prime Minister Macmillan was intensely interested and messages had been passing back and forth about negotiations on the matter, so I was thoroughly informed on it, and had been for a long period.

On the Canadian incident, of that I knew nothing. I arrived in Washington the day the story broke. The first time I heard about it was on my visit to the State Department that day. Then I read about it in the papers the following day. But there would not have been any reason for telling me in London.

Professor ENGBERG. I thought perhaps because of the relationship of the two countries you might have known something about it.

Ambassador BRUCE. No.

Professor ENGBERG. I have another question I have been interested in in view of the past testimony.

We have approximately 30 percent noncareer ambassadors or heads of missions, I think that figure is about right, about 30 percent. What is your thinking in regard to the type of training that men of this sort should have before they are sent out to these posts?

Ambassador BRUCE. I believe it depends entirely on the individual. If a man has been selected for a post because he has the personality, the knowledge, the ability—or is presumed to have—which would fully and adequately equip him for the post, then I should think a month of access to papers and instructions given in the State Department would be sufficient.

The difficulty in the case of nonprofessional ambassadorial appointments arises almost exclusively from the appointment of people who are not given such a mission because of any intrinsic merit.

If you have what is obviously a political appointment made for reasons other than the presumed effectiveness of the individual, I think you are faced with an impossible problem of training and familiarization. I can recollect a few appointments in the past where it would have been perfectly futile to attempt to drive into the brain of the affected individual a real knowledge of the task he was to undertake. I would suggest in those instances the best thing to do would be to give him the most capable deputy chief of mission available.

Professor ENGBERG. You mentioned a moment ago the value that accrued from tenure and staying in a post.

Do you see any way by which a man who is going to be chief of mission could have some sort of an internship or some sort of an experience in the country that he is going into before he is assigned the task of that sort? Some of our previous witnesses have opposed this, and some have thought there was some value in it.

Ambassador BRUCE. I think the difficulty about it is a technical one. An ambassador to any country is accredited to the Chief of State, and it is impossible to have two of them there at the same time. And you cannot have a man come in as an observer of what is going

on in an embassy. The best thing he can do is go to the State Department and, through papers and conversation, absorb what has been happening. I don't think this presents any real problem for an intelligent fellow.

What I do reprobate is the interval, which is usually long, between the departure of one ambassador and the arrival of another. These intervals are often too long. It is a bad thing, I think, to have any protracted period between the headships of a mission.

Professor ENGBERG. I have another question which is in an entirely different area. I suppose this is because of my past experience and training in administration—I find it very difficult to separate policy and policy recommendation from what it is going to cost. I asked this question of another ambassador, and he said, "well, we have just so big a pie to split," and that answered the question.

I think he is perhaps correct, but I am still interested in it. For instance, how much consideration is given to your views on the money to be spent or allocated for programs in England in connection with your recommendations for future policy?

Ambassador BRUCE. Well, I have had a steady reduction in officers since I have been in London.

I think it depends entirely on whether the program which you advocate is sufficiently appealing to your headquarters so that they will divert funds from some other program to your own. And by a program you really mean officers, in this case political and economic officers.

Professor ENGBERG. One further question: You were with the Service during the past administration and you probably knew a former head of the Foreign Agricultural Service.

This gentleman wrote me a letter a few months ago in which he said that one of the problems that they were faced with was that communications from Agriculture personnel that went to State, through the ambassador's office and on to Washington, were frequently very different from the communications that came to Agriculture and to his office from the field. Very often people would come back into his office and say, well now, State had this policy and we termed this letter in this particular way, but here is the actual situation.

I was wondering whether you had any experience in that area and whether you did or did not, what your thought would be in regard to our total policy and security if you had two different types of communications coming in from the field to the two different agencies?

Ambassador BRUCE. I think two different types of communications would be not only confusing and unnecessary, but would also reflect bad administration. From a policy standpoint it is devastating.

In London, I never read any operational cables either coming from our agricultural attaché there or emanating from the Department of Agriculture, except occasionally on a policy matter, say one involving the sale of large amounts of surplus agricultural products, or one relating to some big exhibition which they are to have in the United Kingdom. But I frequently talk to our agricultural attaché about the program of his Department in the United Kingdom, which is an extensive one.

As regards communications, I have never had an instance of the kind that you mentioned, nor has any been called to my attention.

Professor ENGBERG. I think that if it should happen there would be no way of having a set policy. That was my reason for asking the question.

Thank you, Senator Jackson.

Senator JACKSON. Thank you, Mr. Engberg.

Ambassador Bruce, on behalf of the committee I want to express our appreciation for your most generous, illuminating, and helpful contribution to our hearings.

The record will remain open for a memorandum by the Honorable Samuel D. Berger, U.S. Ambassador to Korea.

The committee will now be in recess subject to the call of the Chair.

(Whereupon, at 11:15 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.)

(The memorandum of Ambassador Berger follows:)

INTRODUCTORY NOTE BY SENATOR HENRY M. JACKSON

The subcommittee is pleased to be able to publish this memorandum by the Honorable Samuel D. Berger, U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Korea.

In connection with our inquiry, we asked Ambassador Berger if he would be willing to prepare a memorandum containing the main points which he especially feels it is important to have us consider as we proceed with our study.

Ambassador Berger is among the Nation's most outstanding Foreign Service professionals. Joining the Foreign Service in 1945, he has risen through the ranks to the top positions of deputy chief of mission and now Ambassador. With experience largely overseas, he has seen a good many different ways of leading an embassy and a country team.

We are grateful to Ambassador Berger for making available to us this discerning and helpful statement.

FOREIGN SERVICE STAFFING AND OPERATION PROBLEMS AND THE ROLE OF THE AMBASSADOR

By Hon. Samuel D. Berger

(United States Ambassador to the Republic of Korea)

Memorandum for Senate Subcommittee on National Security Staffing and Operations

I am honored by the kind invitation to submit my views on this subject as it relates to our Foreign Service and the role of an ambassador. I have read with the greatest interest the reports and documentation prepared by the subcommittee and its staff and the testimony of those who have appeared in person, and am deeply impressed with the searching character of this inquiry.

By way of introduction a brief reference to my background and experience may be pertinent, for they have a bearing on my views. I have been working in foreign relations since March 1942 when I joined Mr. Harriman and the lend lease mission in London as a specialist in labor problems. By arrangement with Ambassador Winant I also served as labor attaché to the Embassy—the first such appoint-

ment in any diplomatic service. In 1945 I was invited to enter the Foreign Service at an intermediate grade as an auxiliary officer. This was converted into permanent status in 1947 after an oral examination under the 1946 act to expand the Foreign Service by lateral entry. Between 1948 and 1950 I worked both in the Embassy and with the Marshall plan mission in London. From 1950 to 1953 I was assigned to the Mutual Security Agency in Washington to work on economic aid problems. Subsequently I served in Japan as political counselor (15 months), as deputy chief of mission in New Zealand (4 years), and in Greece (2 years and 9 months). My work during 21 years has thus been in the political, diplomatic, and economic aid fields, as both a specialist and generalist. Before entering the Foreign Service I did undergraduate and graduate work in labor problems, economics, and history at the University of Wisconsin and the London School of Economics; worked with the Rochester (N.Y.) Civic Committee on Unemployment; directed a training center for trade union officials in Chicago; taught trade union problems for five summers in the School for Workers in Industry of the University of Wisconsin; spent nearly a year in England studying the British labor movement, a year in New York as director of the statistics department of a large social service agency handling refugees from Nazi persecution, and a year and a half in Government service working on problems of manpower mobilization.

IMPORTANCE OF DIVERSIFIED EXPERIENCE AND ECONOMIC TRAINING

This variety of education and experience, in and out of government, has been of immense help to me in my Foreign Service career, and it has colored many of my views of the problem of staffing and improving our Foreign Service.

Although there are exceptions, in general an officer who brings to the Foreign Service a broad liberal education with a solid grounding in economics and a variety of experience has an advantage over those who enter the Foreign Service directly from the university with little or no economics training or experience in other fields of work. To correct this, promising officers have in recent years been afforded the opportunity during their careers to diversify their experience by work in other departments or agencies of the U.S. Government, and to spend one or two years in a university to make up gaps in academic training.

I would like to see this program expanded and, especially so, in two directions. In many countries economic aid and development problems now represent a major preoccupation and concern of an embassy. Moreover it is impossible to understand many political situations without a full grasp of the economic setting. A promising officer can develop his knowledge of history, law, politics and diplomacy by reading on his own time. But economics is a more technical discipline requiring university training; and knowledge of economic aid and development programs requires actual grappling with the problems. I have found that senior Foreign Service officers who have neither are handicapped in dealing with many of the basic as well as day-to-day problems which confront the United States in many countries. Experience in military matters is also of great value. I would like to see more of our most promising Foreign Service officers assigned to the

aid program and to the Department of Defense in order to help obtain that cross-fertilization of ideas and experience which I feel is so necessary in much of our oversea work.

CAREER VERSUS NONCAREER AMBASSADORS

I believe in the career principle, and as the years pass I would hope that more and more chiefs of mission will be selected from the career service. I am not, however, a purist. I have worked under noncareer ambassadors and know what a tremendous contribution they can make. This source of talent, leadership, and inspiration should not be cut off in the interests of a principle. There is, however, nothing to be said for appointment to this office of a noncareer man who brings neither interest, nor aptitude, nor professional skills. It is also worth mentioning that short-term noncareer ambassadors usually have no great interest in the long-term improvement of the Foreign Service.

However, if career men are to fill more and more posts as chief of mission, the Foreign Service must be able to produce a larger supply of senior career officers of first-rate ability. I have often been asked how this can be done. My answer is to concentrate on developing more deputy chiefs of mission of top quality. The deputy position is the final testing and training ground for ambassadors, and this assignment should be reserved for officers whose record clearly indicates that they are promising material for ambassadorships. The deputy chief of mission position should not be filled by any officer who is clearly not promising in this respect, nor should it be offered as a reward to an officer for long service, when it is clear that he cannot make the grade to ambassador.

Two reforms recently instituted in the State Department will help in this direction. A special committee under the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Personnel was created last year to identify and develop a list of the ablest and most promising officers who can be groomed for appointment as deputy chief of mission. Additionally, efficiency reports since last year require in the case of class 5 officers and higher an indication of whether the officer is or is not career minister potential. With these two reforms and the rapid promotion of our ablest younger officers, the career service should before long be in position to supply a much larger number of officers of unquestioned competence for the senior positions both in the Department of State and abroad, which will form the reservoir of talent for eventual appointment as deputy chief of mission, and ultimately ambassador.

THE FUNCTION OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION

There is considerable variation in the way a deputy chief of mission functions in our embassies. In some he is a superpolitical counselor, with little interest in or responsibility for the overall work of the embassy. Sometimes he is a kind of handyman to the ambassador with loosely defined functions. This is often the case where an ambassador tries to run all aspects of an embassy's operations from the top and wastes his time doing work that should be left to his deputy.

There is some room for variation for not all embassies have the same problems, and the personality of an ambassador and his deputy chief

of mission are also factors in the situation. There are, however, certain essentials in the operations of every embassy, and it would be desirable if what is now the best practice for deputy chiefs of mission, or something approximating it, was established everywhere.

The concept of the deputy chief of mission held by Ambassador Briggs, with whom I had the privilege to serve as deputy in Athens, is the one which commends itself to me as the ideal. This concept treats the deputy chief of mission as the alter ego to the ambassador. Since the deputy is in charge during the ambassador's absences, he is cut into everything and knows everything that goes on. The administrative device to achieve this is to have the deputy present at all the ambassador's meetings; accompany the ambassador on every possible occasion, including his meetings with the foreign minister; be present when the ambassador receives callers; be present as often as possible at the ambassador's representational functions; have the deputy see all incoming and outgoing official ambassadorial correspondence; and have all work and papers within the embassy come to the ambassador through the deputy. In short, have the deputy serve as "chief of staff" or "executive officer."

Under this system a strong deputy chief of mission can relieve an ambassador of an enormous amount of work, afford the ambassador time to read, think, and write, and to manage his heavy representational responsibilities. For example, if the deputy accompanies the ambassador on a call on the foreign minister, the subsequent reporting can be done by the deputy or divided between them. Since the deputy is constantly exposed to and thoroughly conversant with every aspect of the ambassador's work, views, and activities, he can guide and instruct the section chiefs and heads of the associated agencies with confidence that he is expressing the ambassador's views. Conversely, since the embassy section chiefs and heads of the associated agencies such as USOM and MAAG go through the deputy to the ambassador, the deputy is kept continuously and thoroughly informed on the whole range of problems which confront an ambassador, and he is in a far better position to comment, advise, and even disagree with the ambassador.

The deputy must not be a bottleneck, nor does it follow that no one can see the ambassador directly. What happens in practice under this system when an officer comes to the deputy on a matter that requires ambassadorial attention is that the two go directly to the ambassador to discuss it.

This concept of the deputy's function imposes an enormous amount of work and responsibility on the deputy, and it is by far the most arduous job in an embassy. But by serving in the fashion I have described, the deputy acquires broad knowledge of an embassy's operations; he acquires self-confidence in dealing with every kind of problem; and he is trained and readied for the time when he will be called on to become an ambassador. This concept, or variations of it to suit the personalities involved or the local situation, should become standard practice in all embassies.

LATERAL ENTRY INTO THE FOREIGN SERVICE

I hope that, for some years at least, the practice will be continued to open the Foreign Service to a select and limited number of exceptionally talented people serving in other Government agencies, whose record, experience, interest, and aptitude for the work would add great strength to the Foreign Service.

Many Government agencies now have personnel abroad—Treasury, Commerce, AID, USIS, the military forces, etc. Every now and then one comes across an officer from another agency with unusual qualities for Foreign Service work, a proven record of superior work, and a deep interest in the field of foreign affairs. Such officers should be integrated at the middle grades so that they will have a number of years of solid on-the-job training and experience within the Foreign Service itself to prepare them for senior positions of responsibility. These officers, in addition to bringing welcome talent, serve to sharpen the competition among Foreign Service officers for promotion. It is often only an accident that leads one man into the Foreign Service early in his career and another into a related field, and the fertilization of the Foreign Service by the addition of talented outsiders seems to me to be a practical and desirable way to improve the standard of our Foreign Service.

SPECIALIST VERSUS GENERALIST

This subject has been endlessly debated, but I have long felt that the argument was more theoretical than real. The great need in oversea work is for more people of the highest quality to fill senior officer positions: deputy chief of mission, political and economic counselors, consul general, and special assistant on aid matters. There are certain requirements at the senior level: great energy; passionate interest in the work; mature judgment in foreign affairs that comes only with long and varied experience in the Foreign Service; the capacity to lead and inspire staff; insistence on precision in all parts of the work; a liking for working in foreign countries with all its interest as well as disadvantages; a capacity to adjust to change; and a capacity to win the respect, and, hopefully, the affection of his colleagues and the people of the countries in which he serves. These do not exhaust the list of requirements, but they are among the main ones. Officers who do not possess these qualities should be kept from appointment to senior positions, or weeded out, if they occupy them, in order to make room for topflight officers.

It is not whether a man is a generalist or specialist that brings him to the top, but whether he has capacity, breadth, interest, and initiative—what we call "flair." I have known agricultural, commercial, labor, and treasury attachés who do a fine routine job in their special fields to which no one can take exception. But the specialist with "flair" can make a contribution to the work of an embassy that goes far beyond his field. For example, an agricultural attaché in the normal course of his work has the opportunity to meet farmers and peasants, develop contacts with agricultural leaders, civil servants working on agricultural matters, managers of agricultural banks and cooperatives, etc. If he sees his job in its widest context, he can in the course of his routine work on crops, prices, marketing, etc., develop

invaluable information and reports on the economic and social conditions of farmers, peasants, and farm laborers; on their political attitudes and organizations; on the effect of general economic or finance policy on agriculture; on the relation of the farm community to the whole gamut of society. In short, he can use his specialty to illuminate for the benefit of the embassy all manner of political, economic, and social problems. The same is true of the commercial attachés, labor attachés, treasury attachés, and others.

The broader the interest of the specialist, the greater his capacity and initiative, the more he can contribute to the operations of an embassy and the higher he can aspire in the Foreign Service.

Conversely, the senior generalist who is familiar with all problems but has failed to develop a deep and critical grasp of any of the major fields will lack the self-confidence required to make independent judgments, evaluations, and decisions that he is called on to make week in and week out in a variety of fields. In these days the senior generalist working abroad must have a sufficiently extensive knowledge of economics, labor, agriculture, aid programs, and Communist history, doctrine, and methods—to cite some of the more important areas—or he will be at a great disadvantage in dealing with the complicated problems which confront most embassies.

Stated in another way, the great need in the Foreign Service is for more officers at the top—whether they are generalists or specialists—who have drive and the kind of experience that enables them to relate one field to another. The Foreign Service has many bright and hard working specialists and generalists: what it needs is to select, encourage, guide, and train the most promising for appointment to the senior positions.

ORGANIZATION OF AN EMBASSY AND THE PROBLEM OF COORDINATION

I will introduce this section with two stories.

When I first entered foreign service work in March 1942, I called on Mr. Harriman in London and said we had not had much chance to talk in Washington about the work he wanted me to do and I would be grateful if he would give me some further guidance. I have never forgotten his reply. "It's not what I want you to do: that's not the way I work. What I want to know is what you want me to do. Look around in your field and find out what can be done to help the war effort. To start you off, there is a great shortage of shipping. See what can be done to reduce the turn-around time in British ports. Also there's a great shortage of machine tools. See what can be done to have British factories work their machine tools on second and third shifts. If you can't solve problems at your level and need my help, let me know."

When I arrived in Korea in June 1961, I called the senior staff together and among other things said I would hold a morning meeting of the senior staff at 10:30. No meeting would last longer than 1 hour, and they could schedule their work and appointments accordingly. One of my senior officers asked for an earlier hour since he always holds his section meeting after the ambassador's in order to acquaint his subordinates with the discussion and ambassador's views. The 10:30 hour, he said, would crowd his morning. I said I had chosen

that hour so that he would have time to study incoming communications, read the morning press, and hold his section meeting beforehand. He would then be in position each day to bring to the meeting information, views, and recommendations, developed by him and his section, that the senior staff and I needed if each of us is to do our job properly and in a coordinated way.

There are two theories of running a mission: one is from the top down, the other from the bottom up. I favor the second, for an ambassador must rely on his staff and on staff work, or he will be overwhelmed with details and direction and will be perennially troubled with the problem of coordination.

The system of morning meetings which I use is similar to one used in London by Mr. Julius Holmes, now Ambassador to Tehran, when he was minister and deputy chief of mission in London in 1948–50. It is also much like the system used by Ambassador Briggs when he was in Greece.

Three times a week I meet with my senior staff: the deputy chief of mission, the political and economic counselors, the head of USIS, the special assistant on intelligence, the special assistant for economic and military aid problems, and the treasury attaché.

Once a week at 10:30 there is a general staff meeting, attended by the foregoing plus the U.S. military commander or his representative, the director of USOM, the chief of the military aid program, the service attachés, the head of the consular section, and the head of the administrative section. At this meeting we discuss the developments of the week in respect to the American official community insofar as they are of general interest.

Country team meetings are treated below in a separate section.

Additionally I meet once a week with the commander of the U.S. forces, with additional meetings as required. Meetings with the director of USOM are frequent but are not on a fixed schedule. The chief of the Embassy administrative section reports to me once a week on his area. The deputy chief of mission, as I recorded above, sits in on all meetings.

These are the scheduled meetings. There are in addition constant short meetings with senior officers on specific problems: an outgoing or incoming telegram to be discussed; a dispatch to be reviewed; a hot rumor to be evaluated; an important item in the press or conversation to be called to the ambassador's attention, etc. The great need is for officers, especially at the section chief level, to have immediate and direct access to the ambassador at any time.

In a very real sense the deputy chief of mission and section chiefs are the people who manage and coordinate an embassy's operations. It is up to them to see that an outgoing telegram or dispatch has been fully cleared; that it is written with accuracy and precision and in clear English; that any proposition is thought through before action is taken on the matter or it is brought to the ambassador's attention; that action is initiated and taken by the appropriate person; that work is done promptly and efficiently, and so on. If the four or five senior officers are made to take these responsibilities, they very soon acquire habits of working that make an embassy run smoothly, and they impose the same habits on their subordinates.

With such arrangements an ambassador can keep abreast of all principal matters, can coordinate the work as a whole without the use of intermediaries, and reserves his time and energy for what is most important.

COUNTRY TEAM

The country team meets as required. It is a useful and necessary device for obtaining a coordinated view and action on matters of common or related concern to the Embassy, USOM, and military aid mission, and, in the case of Korea, the U.S. military command, and for educating the different elements in each other's problems. Some people have the mistaken idea that the country team is the place where an ambassador imposes his views on others, using the authority given him by the President. This is not the case. An ambassador leads, he does not order. The various elements of the country team have their own agencies and regulations and policies that have to be considered. What the ambassador strives for is an agreed view which he himself is in accord with and to infuse his own views. When a common view cannot be reached, the country team device helps the ambassador to narrow and identify the differences so that he can formulate with greater precision his own position on a controversial matter. In practice, differences will be rare where the key members are all capable and strong, personally respect each other, and have the opportunity to argue their case at a country team meeting.

It is poor operations to keep referring matters to Washington for decision: an ambassador has the responsibility for resolving problems in the field in the light of general policies set by Washington. On the rare occasions when an issue must be referred to Washington, it is the ambassador's responsibility to define the issue for Washington, submit the different views, and make his own recommendation. Likewise when a Washington general policy is no longer valid or workable, it is the ambassador's responsibility to seek a revision or adjustment, using the country team device to obtain an agreed position or an agreed statement of any differences along with his own views for submission to Washington.

In countries like Korea with large and complicated economic and military aid programs, an ambassador cannot and should not himself try to follow the detailed operations of USOM or the MAAG. He must rely on a special assistant on aid matters whose responsibility it is to keep abreast of day-to-day developments and keep him informed of those elements which require his attention. Other members of his staff, especially the economic and political counselors and treasury attaché, will also be helpful to him in this respect. Without the support, screening, and advice of his own staff an ambassador would, on the one hand, be overwhelmed by details, and on the other, would have to rely entirely on the presentation of the USOM mission director or the chief of the MAAG.

The special assistant for aid matters is therefore a key man on an ambassador's staff. He also serves as secretary of the country team, keeps the minutes, prepares the agenda, sees that papers are circulated in advance of the meeting, and does the staff work between meetings. He is thus the focal point for bringing the different elements of any problem together for the country team's consideration. Unfortu-

nately there are too few officers in the Foreign Service who have the combination of qualities for this work if it is to be done well: aid experience; economic background; tact; an ability to separate the essential from the dross; an ability to handle detail, to analyze and draft; and a capacity to organize a great variety of problems in an orderly manner. I would hope that more Foreign Service officers would be developed for this most important function.

TOUR OF DUTY

I agree wholeheartedly with Ambassador Briggs' testimony that the average tour of duty of our chiefs of mission is too short, and that except in hardship posts with bad climates, they should serve for longer periods.

In the case of deputy chiefs of mission and section chiefs, I strongly recommend 3- to 4-year tours, for they are the dynamos that run an embassy.

There is also much to be said in the case of some important countries for a brilliant younger officer to be returned to the same country later in his career for a second tour of duty at a senior level.

In many countries it is desirable to keep a superior intermediate officer for longer than 4 years, so that he can develop language facility, wide contacts, and an encyclopedic knowledge of the country that can be tapped by his colleagues. One such long-time officer, with another being readied to take his place when he is transferred, can be invaluable in order to provide continuity in an embassy.

REPORTING AND COMMUNICATIONS

I am pleased to record that the overreporting which was a characteristic of the decade after the war is well on the way to being corrected. Reporting for action purposes tends now to be pithy and precise. Descriptive reporting for information purposes is more and more being replaced by analytic reporting useful for policymaking. Biographic reporting and files in many embassies have vastly improved.

A reform in communications I have long advocated is the introduction of numbered paragraphs in all written materials with subparagraphs (a, b, c) and sub-subparagraphs (i, ii, iii) broken out for easy reading. I have used this system for many years and find that it makes for clearer thinking, crisper writing, fewer words, and, of course, it facilitates discussing any document and cross-referencing. Anyone who has had to deal with complicated written instructions or negotiations that come with unnumbered paragraphs knows how inefficient this system can be. At present the decision whether to number paragraphs is left to the discretion of the departmental or Foreign Service officer. It should be made obligatory.

Mr. Harriman in his testimony referred to the difficulty of reading cables that are typed in capital letters. I agree with him. It may speed transmission and processing, but it takes longer to read and digest. Numbering paragraphs and the use of caps and lower case are in my view a necessary reform.

OUR FOREIGN SERVICE IN PERSPECTIVE

Since I have spent 18 of my 21 years in foreign relations working overseas, my experience and the comments in this memorandum deal necessarily with the problems of staffing and operations as seen from the field.

During this time I have had a good opportunity to watch and study the evolution of our Foreign Service and our foreign policy.

The handling of our foreign affairs in 1963 is, in my view, far superior to what it was in 1942–45 when I was first exposed to it. The "old" Foreign Service, if I may use that term, inevitably reflected the isolationist traditions and policies of the United States. Within it there were many brilliant and hard-working officers who have made a distinguished contribution to the conduct of our foreign policies. At the other end were large numbers unaccustomed to dealing with a continuous succession of problems of the kind that now confront us, which require decisions, recommendations, and action.

Because of our isolationist tradition, the "old" Foreign Service was more often a reporting service than an action service; the range of problems on which it worked was much narrower; and the operation as a whole was often haphazard. Prior to World War II, an embassy worked with a tiny staff, and its knowledge of a country was necessarily limited, as were its contacts. On the other hand, there was a fine "esprit de corps" and relations among officers were personal and friendly.

My first experiences during World War II of the way foreign policy was formulated in Washington came as a shock. While policy was often brilliant and well executed, it was generally improvised and there were great gaps. There was no system for formulating policy nor was it well coordinated with other agencies. Moreover, policy was not recorded in a fashion or a form that enabled the people in the field to know clearly what our aims or objectives were or how to achieve them. All this is, of course, well known.

What is not sufficiently appreciated is how far we have improved since those days. Our Foreign Service today can hold its own in any company, and, indeed, in many countries the embassies of friendly nations turn to us for we are usually the best informed. Descriptive reporting has been replaced by reporting for action purposes. The demands on our Foreign Service officers for precision, accuracy, analysis in depth, as well as for security, discretion, and representation become more severe with every year that passes. There is a growing discipline and pride of achievement. Competition within the Service is severe for our efficiency reports have become better and better instruments for assessing the qualities of an officer for purposes of promotion or selection out. The Foreign Service inspection is vastly improved.

Washington now produces for the field excellent statements of our basic policy for each country and "guidelines" for action which are coordinated through the mechanism of the National Security Council and other devices. In the field one no longer works in the dark. The constant exchanges between the embassies and the State Department permit adjustments and revision of basic policy and "guidelines" to the field. As to the sagacity of our policies and activities, this of

course depends on the quality and judgment of the key people in the State Department and in the field. It must, however, be said that in foreign affairs problems are often tremendously complicated and intractable and there are often no ready solutions.

The integration of State Department and the Foreign Service officers was a desirable and necessary reform. It is now the case that State Department officers dealing with foreign affairs must have field experience; and integration has opened up many more opportunities within the State Department for Foreign Service officers on home assignment. At the same time I feel that this reform—accomplished under the Wriston Report—was too extensive and too rapid. A more gradual and selective approach would have produced less anguish and dislocation and made for a smoother transition.

Some of the worst mistakes of this integration have been corrected, although further adjustments are needed. I believe one of these is to restore the former practice of classifying subordinate administrative or "housekeeping" positions as Foreign Service Staff officers. There is no point in pretending that a budget or accounting clerk or similar "housekeeping" officer is interchangeable with a Foreign Service officer, who is a professional engaged in substantive work, or that the two can be treated in the same promotion system. The occasional administrative officer with great general ability should, of course, be afforded the opportunity for transfer to the Foreign Service officer category. Likewise a Foreign Service officer at the lower grades should have a short apprenticeship in the administrative section of an embassy to acquaint him with the work in this area.

The members of the subcommittee will note in this memorandum how frequently I have used the words "senior officers," "section chiefs," and "quality," "experience," and "versatility" especially "at the top." This is the great need. Every embassy needs three or four such officers. It is they who inject their staff with enthusiasm, make even the most humdrum work seem important and exciting, and bring out the best in their subordinates. It is they who in the final analysis are in a position to train and develop the talent needed at the top. Although the ambassador gives tone and direction to a mission, it is the senior officers who are his eyes and ears, and sometimes his mouth. The needs of the Foreign Service around the world are for 300 to 400 officers of the highest quality and the Department needs about the same number. There are many now in place and I see no reason why the balance cannot be developed within the next few years.

The Foreign Service is no "striped pants" profession. One rarely wears them these days. It is an exacting, arduous profession requiring hard work, skills, devotion, sacrifice, discipline, strong nerves, and judgment. It is worthy of the best brains and talent that the United States can provide.

That our Foreign Service has been able to weather the whirlwind changes of the last 18 years, has adjusted to the new and heavy responsibilities thrust upon it since 1945, and has emerged in as good form as it has from the repeated reorganizations and assaults is a tribute in large measure to that stalwart group of first rate "old-line" Foreign Service officers, most of whom have now retired. It is they who have nurtured, encouraged, protected and educated the present generation of Foreign Service officers during these turbulent years.

There are now moving into many senior positions the new generation bred during the time when the United States assumed great international responsibilities. In this new generation there are many men of first rate ability and I look forward with confidence to rising standards of staff and performance in our Foreign Service, providing we have seen the last of the major reorganizations and drastic changes. What the career Foreign Service needs now is to be allowed to settle down, perfect its operations, do its job, and develop an "esprit de corps" that is so essential to any good organization.

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Remarks:

Attached is testimony of Ambassador Reischauer and Ambassador Bruce before the Jackson Subcommittee on the problem of staffing for national security.

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